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# West Europe Report

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9 September 1983

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 2201

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## ANTITANK DEFENSE ROLE IN FORWARD DEFENSE

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Aug 83 pp 18-25

[Article by Colonel Edelfried Baginski: "The Antitank Defense of the Combat Forces--A Prerequisite for Forward Defense"]

[Text] Starting with a general account of our own forces which are committed for forward defense, Colonel Edelfried Baginski, department head in the General Army Office, describes the organization, equipment, and operational principles of the potential enemy, which in the last 15 years has increased really dramatically the combat effectiveness of its formations in terms of both quality and quantity. From the pattern of war in the 1980's which thus emerges, conclusions are drawn as to our own combat forces.

From the perspective of the present, I would date the birth of the antitank defense as being on 20 November 1917--which is the beginning of the tank battle of Cambrai in the First World War. Not because it was here that perhaps for the first time in history an antitank defense was organized. On the contrary, the combat forces at that time, namely the infantry, sought with little success, despite admirable bravery, to halt the monstrosities which were slowly and clumsily rolling toward them by using improvised resources--hand grenades, concentrated charges, machinegun fire directed at the vision slots, and so forth. Only the field artillery was able to furnish the first effective resistance, although with heavy losses. Nevertheless this was the birth of the antitank defense, because the German army leadership recognized for the first time the full extent of the danger which came from the tanks, and understood that it was necessary to develop and translate into action as rapidly as possible a plan for defending against tanks with respect to tactics, operational principles, training, and equipment. Since then, such concepts have been constantly developed further by all the military powers in the world, and adjustments have been made to the basic conditions of the corresponding time periods. The Bundeswehr as well has been concerned with these problems ever since it was established, and it will remain so as long as armored weapon systems play an important role on any future battlefield. From today's perspective, this means

until far beyond the turn of the century. The Bundeswehr has the mission in peacetime, together with the troops of our alliance partners, to maintain a constant operational readiness so as to deter an enemy from threatening or employing military force.

In a national defense emergency, together with the alliance partners it must maintain or restore the integrity of the territory of the FRG by means of a forward defense.

The operational task of this forward defense requires:

Containing and smashing the attacker at the border;

wearing down the following echelons even as they are advancing;

preventing any penetration into the defense, any encirclement, or breakthroughs;

regaining lost ground or restoring the continuity of the defense.

A glance at the map shows that because of the small area involved there is no alternative to the forward defense. And this fact has been the undoing of all the alternative concepts published so far, such as an area defense, and so forth. On this subject Minister Woerner said on 20 October 1982 in Hagen: "The principle of the forward defense is a key element of our strategy. Alternative concepts which give up the principle of forward defense and put in its place a conflict of attrition on our territory are not acceptable." Of the four operational tasks enumerated above, three of them can be adhered to only through combat forces. Therefore it is necessary to briefly consider the combat forces of the Bundeswehr and thus the core of the army.

#### Our Own Forces--Chief Opponent of the Enemy's Tanks

The 12 divisions placed under NATO contain 36 brigades, of which 17 are armored brigades, 15 are armored infantry brigades, 3 are airborne brigades, and 1 is a mountain infantry brigade.

The territorial army, which has the mission of maintaining the freedom of maneuvering of the allied forces committed at the front and of performing tasks of military national defense, includes inter alia 6 operational but partially only cadre-strength home defense brigades (HSchBrig), 6 other HSchBrig as equipment units, 45 security battalions, and also 150 motorized home defense companies. Thus in a national defense emergency the army can grow from 341,000 to over 900,000 men.

Like the field brigades, the home defense brigades include all the elements needed for combined-arms combat--that is, infantry, battle tanks, artillery, and engineers. Thus I would like to examine the distribution of roles within the combat forces.

## Armored Combat Forces Form the Core

The armored combat forces form the core of the field army. It follows from the conditions of the terrain and the nature of the threat that an appropriate and balanced composition of various components of armored and light combat forces is needed. Tube weapons and missiles are mutually complementary and are not in competition with one another. In addition, in our lightly settled terrain an infantry component is needed which also is capable of combat in builtup areas and forest fighting. But all elements must have one thing in common: The capability of independent combat against the enemy tanks--the main adversary.

Combat forces must be qualified for effective engagement in all three types of battle--delaying action, defense, and attack--under all the weather, terrain, and visual conditions which can occur. Limitations arise here in connection with the infantry (motorized infantry) with respect to attack and in delaying action. Even for defensive purposes such an infantry is suited only in terrain especially appropriate to it and after a corresponding preparation time. Defense over overextended positions--the rule for the most part--is possible only with highly mobile, rapidly movable armored forces.

## The Distribution of Roles

For the foreseeable future, battle tanks will form the hard core of the armored combat forces. The elements of firepower, survivability, and mobility which particularly characterize them enable precisely these weapons to engage in the necessary highly mobile conduct of operations. In defense and especially in delaying action, tank formations and units are able to produce a strong effect with their weapons on the enemy through a rapid development of local fire superiority, to again and again assault him with surprise fire, or to strike and locally destroy him in brief counterattacks. Even numerically superior enemy forces can be greatly worn down in this way. In attack, tank battalions form the core of the attacking troops. Through accurate firing while maneuvering, they develop an optimal striking power and thus create the prerequisite for penetration of the enemy and for the breakthrough.

Armored infantrymen are an armored "multipurpose infantry." They fight above all in broken terrain against an enemy infantry, against lightly armored enemy forces, and also against enemy battle tanks which work directly in cooperation with motorized riflemen. Their automatic guns are effective weapons against enemy helicopters and low-altitude aircraft. Thus they extensively compensate for the weaknesses of the battle tank and form its indispensable and effective complement. In attack and in delaying action, armored infantrymen fight mounted from armored personnel carriers or, if the situation requires this, dismounted with support from the vehicle-mounted automatic cannons kept closely nearby. Only with an effective and survivable armored personnel carrier equipped with vehicle-mounted automatic guns do infantrymen become armored infantrymen.



As a rule, in the defensive situation armored infantrymen fight dismounted, from emplacements. In this case, the armored personnel carriers are kept closely nearby and ensure with their vehicle-mounted automatic guns and the mounted or unmounted antitank defense weapon MILAN a heavy repelling firepower as well as the high mobility also needed in defense. But in reference to the further development of the armored infantry units it must be pointed out that the composition of such differing components as infantry troops, antitank defense weapons, and automatic cannons in one weapon system raises leadership problems.

Tank destroyer units--which are equipped with the long-range antitank missile systems HOT and TOW on missile-equipped tank destroyers JAGUAR 1 and 2--destroy enemy battle tanks above all at far combat ranges so distant that neither battle tanks nor other armor-piercing weapons can be used as yet with the same accuracy of fire or destructive effect. They work together closely with their own battle tanks or armored infantrymen and for the most part these are mobilized in platoons, because of the conditions of the terrain.

Although technical reconnaissance resources are gaining more and more in importance, armored reconnaissance units remain an important means available to the leader of a major formation (brigade, division) to obtain information early on about the enemy through scouting and radar reconnaissance. The typical employment of the armored reconnaissance units comes about in the form of light (2 armored reconnaissance vehicles LUCHS), heavy (3 battle tanks LEOPARD), or mixed reconnaissance patrols. Armored reconnaissance units are particularly suited for delaying action, in addition to supplying area security and monitoring.

Motorized infantry, paratroopers, and mountain infantry form the light infantry and perform special tasks for the most part. Their importance is undiminished in magnitude when they are supplied with modern equipment and weaponry, in view of the large proportion of cultivated or forested terrain in the FRG. Their varied weaponry and outfitting with mortars, antitank guided missiles, automatic cannons, machineguns, sniper and automatic rifles, panzerfausts, grenade pistols, antitank mines, fragmentation mines, hand grenades, and so forth enables them to protect or defend areas or districts. But for that purpose they need suitable terrain, time to prepare their defense, and usually support from armored combat forces and engineering forces. Under these conditions, they are also able to ward off enemy armored attacks.

From these characteristic features of the individual service branches it follows that on the battlefield there is no separate juxtaposing, but rather that the armored combat forces must be understood as a system which is balanced in its components.

In order to ensure that the cooperation of all parts is as close as possible, our armored brigades and armored infantry brigades are organized in such a way that they have available to them the elements of battle tanks, tank destroyers, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled mortars, and armored

reconnaissance vehicles, along with the diverse weapons contained in them also. In order to achieve an optimal effect, in almost every situation an arrangement of the troops--the tactical grouping--is ordered which differs from the peacetime basic organization of the formations. In this way, mixed armored units are formed which are harmonized with the tactical purpose in each case. And in these units the various components of armored combat forces mutually reinforce each other or undertake an appropriate mixing of weapons which is adapted to the situation.

#### Combat Support

In view of an enemy which conducts combat at his points of main effort with numerically superior armored formations having great striking and fire power and almost uninterrupted combat support including the use of the air, the problem for our own combat forces can be solved only if they are committed in conjunction with our own suitable combat support.

This support includes above all:

The artillery troops with their tube and missile artillery;

the engineering troops with minelaying and minesweeping systems as well as bridge-building and river-crossing systems, and so forth;

the army air defense artillery with ROLAND, GEPARD, and infrared-guided man-portable anti-aircraft missiles;

the army aviation troops with their antitank and transport helicopter formations, and

the NBC defense force.

For reasons of the subject matter involved, we cannot consider in more detail here the combat support troops. However, the key to success demonstrably lies in optimal combined-arms combat.

#### The Potential Aggressor

##### Organization and Equipment

A decisive yardstick for our own defense efforts can and must be simply the extent of the potential threat. The fact that the realities in the form of scarce financial resources often do not make adequate allowances for this aspect does not alter the soundness of this requirement.

If we consider the development of the Soviet divisions and regiments, we find that although the number of major formations essentially remains unaltered, nevertheless within the formations a significant quantitative and qualitative reinforcing is taking place with weapon systems of all kinds, with this being logically connected with a corresponding increase in the personnel.

#### Examples of Quantitative Improvements Are

Comparison of the 1965/1980 motorized rifle regiments;

outfitting of motorized rifle divisions with an additional tank battalion having 51 battle tanks, producing an increase in the number of tanks from 220 to 271 tanks;

an increase in the number of combat armored personnel carriers in the companies from 10 to 12--that is, to 348 in the motorized rifle division (MotSchtzDiv);

increases in the minesweeping facilities and the bridging equipment;

incorporation of a motorized rifle battalion in the tank regiments of the tank division, as well as incorporation of an artillery battalion with self-propelled howitzers, in connection with which an increase from 6 to 8 guns in the batteries can be seen. This means that the regiments are being "enlarged" to major formations comparable to our brigades, and thus they are being qualified for combined-arms fighting down to the battalion level;

enlargement of the attack helicopter formations.

#### Examples of Qualitative Improvements

With each MotSchtzDiv one motorized rifle regiment has been converted from using the wheeled armored personnel carrier BTR 60 to the combat armored personnel carrier BMP 1;

the BMP 2 (M 1981) is being introduced (BMK 30 mm);

the T-64/72 has replaced the older T-62 in the divisions of category 1;

the unprotected field guns and field howitzers are being replaced increasingly by armored artillery;

the fire control of the artillery is taking on a new quality through electronic fire-control computers and laser rangefinders;

outfitting with passive night-vision equipment on a light-amplifier basis is far advanced;

new and more effective antitank guided missiles such as SPIRAL (5,000 m), SPANDREL (4,000 m), and SPIGOT (2,000 m) are being introduced;

the grenade automatic weapon AGS 17 (caliber 30 mm) with its range of up to 1,200 m is supplementing the outfitting of the motorized rifle units with heavy weapons.

These examples should suffice at this point to illustrate the further developments taking place among the ground forces of the Warsaw Pact.

## Operational Principles--Offensive Is the Main Type of Combat

According to doctrine, regulations, training, and equipment, the Red Army is oriented to the offensive. Attack is the main type of combat. Defense is carried out only by adjacent sectors or to protect the flanks of the attack wedges. This doctrine is given both a historical and ideological justification (Napoleon, Second World War, Frunze, Lenin).

According to Soviet principles, only in a determined attack which is conducted at a high tempo and in great depth can the enemy be destroyed in a short time and his will to resist be paralyzed, can important areas, installations, and political and economic centers be taken. The operational principles of the Red Army are in line with this objective.

In the region of the FRG, with a border with the Warsaw Pact which is roughly 1,700 km long, one can anticipate an attack from three fronts (army groups) consisting of 13 to 14 armies with 58 divisions as the first strategic echelon. After a further deployment, this would be followed by two fronts with about 30 divisions. There remains a strategic reserve of about 15 to 20 divisions and in addition some airborne divisions.

Armies--four to five divisions strong--fight along operational alignments and are divided into echelons. Thus in this way a front of the first echelon can be followed by four echelon successions in the course of operations. This allows operations using fresh troops in each case for a period of at least three weeks (sustained operation).

The frontages of the combat zones depend on the mission and on the massed concentration. They can be up to 30 km for a division in attack and up to 15 km for a regiment. In the main attack sector, these frontages are often less than half as long.

## Artillery is the "Lord" of the Battlefield

Preceding the attack is an intensive reconnaissance. It is not without reason that each regiment possesses an armored reconnaissance company and each division has an armored reconnaissance battalion with four companies which use battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, and radar and radio reconnaissance. The Red Army places special emphasis on an overpowering fire support. The dictum of Stalin--"the artillery is the god of the battlefield"--has met with a special acceptance and appreciation there, in view of the strong antitank defense of NATO which relies extensively on missiles. This reveals itself clearly, for example, in the already indicated increase in the number of artillery and mortar weapons in the motorized rifle division by 60 percent as well as in the assignment to the fronts of artillery divisions each with 240 cannons/howitzers and 72 BM 27's.

Service Regulation 256 of the NVA [National People's Army] says in this regard: "The effect on the morale of the enemy not only is dependent on the magnitude of the losses inflicted on him, but also increases significantly when these losses occur in the shortest possible time."

Therefore a shelling density against known positions/strongholds of 200 shots per hectare is insisted on--that is, one of 1,200 shots against a platoon stronghold with a frontage of 6 hectares. Of that, 50 percent of the shells are to be fired within the first 5 minutes. This means a shelling density of about 20 shots per hectare/min. In the Soviet attacks at Stalingrad in 1942/43, densities of 4 to 5 shots per hectare/minute were achieved.

Furthermore, in principle there also occurs a close support by tactical air armies which in wartime are incorporated in the fronts. This means: We see there that the air forces are an integral component of the firing system of the ground forces. Likewise attack helicopter formations are also placed under the armies.

The formations/major formations attack independently of one another in the ordered directions, in the course of which often major gaps arise which are monitored by reconnaissance forces or the like. The mixing of battle tanks and motorized riflemen is done down to the company level.

Motorized riflemen accompany the battle tanks in the mounted configuration as long as possible. When the situation requires it, they dismount at the last cover and attack on foot in front, behind, or between the battle tanks/armored personnel carriers.

#### Influence of Terrain, Climate, and Weather

These influences on the battle are significant, because they modify the effectiveness of many weapons, and they must be taken into account in the planning and development of military hardware.

The terrain structure in the FRG and the statistical distribution of visual contacts and line-of-sight distances are widely known. The latter above all are important to the requirements to be placed on the responsiveness of weapons. Nevertheless, such statistical data should not be overrated. For example, even though according to recent visual-range investigations in the northern German lowland, some 88 percent of all visual contacts for MILAN gunners or gunners from battle tanks are not longer than 2,000 m, nevertheless the percentage of all visual ranges falling within the visual-range interval between 1,500 m and 2,000 m varies as follows:

in the district of Grossburgwedel, about 55 percent;

in the district of Luenenburg only about 8 percent.

Differing lookout altitudes or small local displacements within the same terrain can lead to differing distributions of the ranges of visibility, and so can the growing seasons associated with the time of the year.

In connection with all the considerations on the development of our combat forces, it must not be left out of account that, for example, according to statistical investigations the following conditions prevail in the northern German lowland, on an annual average:

30 days of fog, with visibility below 1,000 m;

60 days of mist, with visibility from 1 to 4 km;

20 days of heavy precipitation or stormy weather, with visibility below 2 km;

35 days of overcast sky at a level of 500 ft (166 m).

The limitations are obvious which long-range combat support as well as air-force action experience because of this. Also those seasons with snow, thawing weather, and their secondary phenomena can exert a strong influence on the employment of weapon systems and thus on the battle.

#### The War Pattern of the 1980's

Given an appropriate political situation, the Warsaw Pact armed forces can carry out a surprise attack with those forces which they currently have stationed in the areas bordering the NATO states--for example, an attack proceeding from a maneuver. Their capability of doing this has grown considerably, according to what we have said previously. Surprising the defender is a basic requirement of the Soviet strategy. Consequently, at the beginning of a conflict they will have the advantage in that they will dictate the action, by being able to carefully prepare the moment, place, organization of forces, and points of main effort for the offensives in that terrain of the FRG which is known to them in the most detail (see Soviet terrain reconnaissances, for example the OSTPREUSSENBLATT of 9 April 1983, Disclosures: "From the Records of General Dubicki"). Therefore it is crucial for NATO to promptly increase or establish its defense readiness in a state of tension. Thus it is an indispensable requirement that today and in the future the NATO brigades must have an operational readiness level which is as high as possible, in order to ensure an effective defense far to the front even in case of a short early-warning time. Because--as retired Lieutenant General Wenner expressed it recently--"if the army defense line between the Baltic Sea and the Alps breaks, all the efforts of the air force and navy will be useless."

It is to be expected that the attacker will draw up along the entire width of the frontage in order to find gaps or weak points in the defense, to tie down the forces of the defender, and if the occasion arises to break through deep into the area by means of a rapid shifting of main attacks with its armored forces, without regard to NATO formations which are still holding on. This will be accompanied by airborne landings and by the employment of sabotage and espionage groups in NATO uniforms as well as by an enormous propaganda barrage.

#### Superior Balance of Forces

In this connection, in the main enemy attacks one can expect force ratios of 6 : 1 for battle tanks, 7 : 1 for armored personnel carriers, and 7 - 10 : 1 for artillery, as is also presented by way of example in the illustrations.

In view of this war pattern, anyone who has an adequate amount of experience or even imagination can only be astonished at the naivete of many "alternative concepts" (see, for example, DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT of 19 June 1983, "Should the Bundeswehr Reequip?"). In view of his resources and mentality with respect to a defender fighting with rifles, undoubtedly the potential enemy would scornfully march right through our country.

Combat at overextended positions will be the rule--as was already mentioned. Overextended positions arise through:

Defender's forces which are too small relative to the width of the frontage to be protected:

losses of personnel and weapon systems arising in the course of engagements;

changes in the shape of the front, for example kinks because of penetrations, and so forth.

These force ratios and the frontages of the combat zone have the result that neither the attacker nor the defender can completely fill in their combat zone with troops. On the other hand, in penetrations or breakthroughs the attacker presents deep flanks which only armored combat forces can take advantage of for rapid counterattacks from any position. Number 1003 of Regulation 100/100 TF expresses this clearly: "Open spaces, gaps, and exposed flanks are just as much a part of the features of the battle as close engagement with the enemy, encirclement, and combat at the rear of our own and enemy forces."

What Does This Mean for the Combat Forces?

What requirements are placed on them in view of this pattern of war?

It is not necessary for one to think only of the employment of tactical nuclear weapons to clearly realize that the paramount operational objective of holding onto our area close to the border as long as possible--that is, of defending it--can be facilitated neither through a sort of rigid Maginot Line nor through an area defense in depth, whatever the nature of this. On the contrary, this task can be carried out only by utilizing all the possibilities given by planning and technology for tactical and strategic mobility. What does this mean?

As defenders, we need the maximum possible responsiveness and the resolute will to not passively suffer the combat but also and precisely in the defense situation to seize the initiative and to shape the battle actively according to our own will.

This requires:

A high mobility and swiftness of action by the leadership and troops, in order to do the following:

- to be able to concentrate forces and fire at rapidly changing points of main effort,
- to utilize the high firepower of the tank guns and missiles with their repelling effect in combat from emplacements at ranges as far away as possible,
- on the other hand, with the high striking power of the armored units and formations, to strike the enemy's flanks in raid-like actions, or to completely destroy him locally when he has been weakened by our defensive fire,
- to commit reserves if the situation requires it or is favorable for doing this, and to quickly provide ourselves again with new reserves by disbanding uncommitted forces;

an extensive survivability of the individual weapons and weapon systems above all against the action of superior enemy artillery, in order to maintain the combat effectiveness of the formations and units as long as possible or to diminish their attritions;

the best possible cross-country capability of the vehicles and weapon systems of the combat forces, in order to be able to optimally utilize the terrain;

a multiplicity of different weapons, ammunition, and explosive ordnance with various functions, in order to prevent a one-sided optimization of protection on the part of the enemy;

at least that number of weapons and units needed to cover and defend the combat zones as completely as possible with fire, barriers, and spotting;

the outfitting of all branches of the army with weapons suited to antitank defense;

an efficient reconnaissance which constantly furnishes in real-time transmission a current and correct picture of the enemy's order of battle;

and finally a strong and effective combat support inclusive of the air force, in order to wear down the subsequent enemy echelons even as they are advancing, in such a way that the combat forces can still repulse these forces.

In order to be able to fulfill these requirements, what is needed above all is the participation of our technical intelligence as well in order to ensure for the future also that our combat forces will be outfitted with military hardware which is survivable and suitable for antitank defense, in view of the increased threat as well as our limited resources.



## Conclusion

The antitank defense remains as much as ever and in the long run more than ever before the main task of the army in its forward defense. It must be initiated at the greatest possible range in order to reduce early on the numerical superiority of the attacker, and it must be based on a multiplicity of different weapons, ammunition, and explosive ordnance. It needs a high survivability above all against the effect of superior enemy artillery, in order to prevent a paralyzing or destruction of our antitank defense itself.

The forces committed for defense must be suited to a mobile conduct of operations, in order

to strike at the enemy;

to regain lost areas;

to close gaps which have been torn open.

The risk becomes more calculable for the attacker if the forces committed by the defender are no longer simultaneously and equally capable of both defense and attack operations.

The ability to have this flexible defense--namely to strike back quickly, strongly, and right at the border--is supplied above all by the armored combat forces. But their motivation and performance depend not least also on an outfitting which is suited to the threat and is continually accommodated to the current state of the art.

In view of the long development times for new military hardware and the rapid advances in essential technological sectors, the realizing of the needed armament represents a constant challenge for defense planning and the army's weaponry in the widest sense. Here one can only wish for all parties concerned that they have courage and an eye for the realities and for what is essential.

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## OIL CONSUMPTION LEVELING OFF

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 10 Aug 83 p 25

[Text] According to Oil Industry Association managing director Henrik Lundsten, the drop in oil consumption has clearly begun to slow down.

According to Lundsten, several reasons for this development can be found. "Switching from oil to other forms of energy for heating is just no longer happening. Consumers too have attested to the fact that the prices [of different fuels] in relation to one another are gradually returning to what they were before and they believe that the international price evolution of oil will be stable within a few years time," Lundsten said.

During the first half of this year 4.7 percent more liquid fuels than a year before were consumed in auto traffic. The consumption of light fuel oil dropped by 6 percent. On the other hand, heavy fuel oil sales obviously dropped more sharply, that is, 29 percent less than last year's.

The association estimates that oil consumption this year will be about 7 percent below last year's level. The count for the first half of the year was, however, almost 16 percent, so that a sharp change from the current basis must occur in the development of the final 6 months of the year.

## Gasoline Sales Increased by 5.5 Percent

Between January and June gasoline sales increased by 5.5 percent over last year's. According to the Oil Industry Association, among other things, the fact that there was a mild winter with little snow had an effect on this. From the standpoint of driving, the weather a year before was significantly worse. The considerable increase in new car sales also increased gasoline sales.

For the past several years the increase in gasoline consumption in Finland has been at a clearly lower rate than in other West European countries.

During the first half of the year diesel oil consumption increased by 3.7 percent. This is primarily the result of the increase in diesel-fueled passenger cars and small delivery trucks. The consumption of diesel oil by heavy equipment was, on the other hand, below the level of the first half of last year

due to disturbances affecting lumber sales and the industry's reduced production.

Taking into account the differences in temperature, it has been estimated that the consumption of light oil decreased by 6 percent. According to the association, consumers had in addition last year exhausted greatly increased supplies and during the first half of the year sales were 21.5 percent below last year's.

They believe that improvement of the use coefficient of heating systems and then too insulation of housing units and other such measures have had a primary effect on the reduction in consumption.

The drop in heavy fuel oil sales is first of all due to the switching of fuels in the lumber industry and at remote heating plants as well as the mild weather. Sales have reduced consumption more because users too have reduced supplies.

During the first half of the year LPG consumption remained practically unchanged.

Oil Product Sales in Finland  
January-June 1983

<u>Product</u>	<u>Sales (tons)</u> <u>Jan-Jun 1983</u>	<u>Change in Comparison</u> <u>with Jan-Jun 1982 (%)</u>	<u>Oil Products' Share</u> <u>of Total Sales (%)</u>
Gasoline	672,427	+ 5.5	16.2
Kerosene for auto engines	7,880	- 3.6	0.2
Kerosene for aircraft	46,737	+ 9.6	1.1
Diesel oil	575,627	+ 3.7	13.8
Light fuel oil	1,146,445	-21.5	27.5
Heavy fuel oil	1,244,576	-29.1	29.9
LPG	69,182	- 7.2	1.7
Lubricants	49,214	+ 0.3	1.2
Other oil products	348,926	- 3.2	8.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,161,014</b>	<b>-15.8</b>	<b>100</b>
 Natural gas	 303,273	 - 9.3	
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,464,287</b>	<b>-15.4</b>	

11,466  
CSO: 3617/165

## U.S.-EEC DIFFERENCES ON TRADE, ECONOMIC POLICY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Aug 83 p9

[Article by Heinz Stadlmann, Brussels: "Worries About America. The Difficult Position of the Europeans"]

[Text] European-U.S. economic relations have once again entered stormy waters. The Europeans are watching with increasing concern the strong rise of the dollar value and the behavior of interest rates in the United States. The feeling of being powerless and at the mercy of this development and of finding hardly any sympathy in Washington for its negative effects on the European countries, intensifies doubt about the vision of President Reagan's policies. In addition to the dollar and interest rates, the U.S. Government's policy decisions are irritating. The protectionist measures against European high-quality steel manufacturers only a few weeks after the solemn promises of the Williamsburg economic summit came as a hard blow. The fact that quotas and tariff increases were imposed on relatively modest imports in spite of the robust U.S. economic recovery, must shock America's trading partners. Of additional concern is America's needling the European Economic Community on its agricultural policies.

The music accompanying the economic and commercial policy quarrels sounds shrill. Yet the impression that European-U.S. relations are strained because of the most recent events, ignores the earlier differences about the same questions. Already in the sixties, U.S. dollar and budgetary policies drove the Europeans to despair when they were made involuntary co-financiers of the Vietnam war and when they spared the country from increasing taxes because they bought American bonds. In the decade of the seventies, it was the weak dollar and exorbitant inflation the Europeans didn't like. Now it is the high U.S. budget deficit and its upward push on interest rates which, in turn, makes the value of the dollar soar. The conflict surrounding the European steel shipments to the U.S., which worried people already 20 years ago, is also somewhat of a tradition. Also more than two decades ago, there was talk of a "chicken war" between the United States and Europe and then-President Eisenhower sent a personal note to Chancellor Adenauer on the subject. EC agricultural policies with their protectionist features have always been a thorn in America's flesh. However, they consistently

failed to see that the EEC was still the largest importer of agricultural products and that a considerable portion of Europe's high trade deficit with the United States was caused by the latter's agricultural exports.

If Europe takes these differences with the Americans more seriously today, it is mainly because the economic situation has completely changed. Washington's financial and trade measures which, in the past, were a mere irritation to the partners and which had few negative effects, are leading to entirely different consequences today. For the European countries, economic recovery from the deepest postwar recession is hardly possible without a decline in the level of American interest rates. Any notion that the EEC could insulate itself from developments in the United States is an illusion; unless it is willing to cut itself off from all foreign exchange and trade operations. The fact that the U.S. Government has assumed a high degree of responsibility for the Western world when it adopted these policies, does not seem to be properly understood by Washington's top leaders. A leading power, which is building on the cooperation of its partners, cannot afford to focus primarily on U.S. interests. The stubborn refusal to accept the historically unprecedented budget deficit as the decisive cause of high interest rates and, therefore, of the additional difficulties the Europeans and the even more deeply indebted developing countries are facing is a clear indication of the lack of understanding of this global responsibility.

The same is true for U.S. trade policies. It is correct though that the major part of all commodity trade transactions is still being conducted in a liberal environment and without obstacles. But it is equally clear that, as a result of the economic crisis and its high unemployment, the tendency to escape into protectionism is constantly growing. If the leading economic power resorts again and again to protectionist measures, in spite of its constant assurances that it will maintain free trade, then it risks its credibility.

Increasingly, Americans hold protectionism in the supplier countries and subsidies of other nations responsible for their protectionist measures. Replacing one evil with another has, of course, been a tried and proven device, but we must warn against retaliatory policies. Experience has shown that the wrong ones get hurt and that they can easily set off a chain reaction. The subsidy argument, on the other hand, seems to have much more validity. The European steel industry, which some countries could, for years, only keep alive by the use of subsidies, shouldn't really have been surprised when the Americans took action last year against this type of competition. Still, it is unclear to what extent the failure of its own industry bore the main responsibility for the misery of U.S. steel producers and what effect imports really had. But those who hadn't yet removed completely the beams from their eyes, could at least sympathize. There is no such thing in the case of high-grade steel because there are neither subsidies nor excessive imports. Here, they no doubt have given in to pressure from industry and members of Congress who worry about their reelection and play the protectionist card without hesitation.

The Americans look better in the controversy relating to agricultural trade where it is their declared aim to get a handle on European export subsidies. Regardless of what the United States can be accused of with regard to subsidies,

it was the EEC which used substantial subsidies to get its agricultural exports going and which has since become the second largest exporter. Formally, the Europeans can point to the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which permits such subsidies. But economic reason is not on their side. It doesn't make any economic sense to produce goods that can only be exported with the help of high subsidies once the domestic market is saturated. Competitors have no choice but to apply the same means, which is pretty expensive for all those involved. In the EEC, nobody wants to admit that GATT approval of export subsidies was made dependent on their being dismantled. If the Europeans don't come to their senses, we could get into a "trade war" with the United States in this area, which until now has always been pooh-poohed somewhat hastily.

7821

CSQ: 3620/444

## ARMS MANUFACTURE STIMULATES TECHNOLOGICAL/ECONOMIC PROGRESS

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 18 Jul 83 pp 30-35

[Article by Philippe Gazier and Jean Gloaguen]

[Text] Along the Champs Elysees filed the prestigious 14 July parade and the soldiers of the new rapid action force. Behind the scenes is the third leading arms industry in the world, a technological driving force for the nation. The French economy actually owes a great deal to its national arms industry which by itself provides a fifth of the total national spending on research and development. First of all, France owes its arms industry 310,000 jobs, 25 billion francs in exports, and a significant transfer of knowhow to civilian industries. These reasons make it easier to understand why the uproar against the French "gun merchants" has died down.

## Specifics

With a total sales volume of about 77 billion in 1982, the armament industry carries almost as much weight as the Peugeot group and more than the CGE [General Electric Company]. A specific organization set up in 1961 in order to oversee the preparations for and establishment of the strike force coordinates the activities of this industry: this organization is the DGA [General Delegation for Armament], directed by Mr Emile Blanc. Mr Blanc is the engineer who prepared the new military programming law for 1984 to 1988. This law was finally passed, despite the opposition in the senate, and it should enable the research effort to be continued.

"Defense retains its priority in government spending," said Mr Charles Hernu, "for it is in a period of economic crisis that this effort must be maintained." In other words, Title V (armed forces equipment funding), which is a little over 300 billion francs (in 1983 francs) for the 5-year period, will not be a

victim of budget austerity programs. This is an indispensable condition if French military hardware, and with it a good number of industrial sectors, is to remain at the highest possible technological level.

Palaiseau, 26 and 27 April 1983: on the Polytechnical School campus, a major "premiere": about a thousand people from industry, from universities, and from the military came to take part in the National Conference on Science and Defense. From aerodynamics to nuclear power, from biology to the automation of production--all fields in some way related to defense were present. "The ministry of defense has to conduct research over a very broad front," pointed out Professor Andre Rousset, Mr Hernu's scientific adviser. And for good reason, as preparations for war--when not actually war itself--provide a testing ground for a good many discoveries. In other words, in France the talent of military engineers and scientists is the best safeguard for the nation's power.

#### Protection

The endless cycle of the gun and armor: as soon as a piece of military equipment is improved, it becomes essential to find a means of protection against it. And as the wealthy countries no longer believe in large battalions, they now perfect equipment at an accelerated pace. An example of this is the field of optronics. This is a marriage of optical information and electronic information. It should make it possible to surprise an enemy at night or during periods of heavy fog. "This discipline will be at the heart of all the major arms programs around 1995," said Jean-Louis Vrolyk, principal engineer at the DTCA [Technical Direction for Aeronautic Construction], "but its use will be multifunctional: piloting and navigation, detection and identification, alert, etc." One of the major concerns will be to have jamming devices, and at the same time, countermeasures and decoys to protect against such devices.

This is a wild race that demands massive investments. It is believed that military products require 20 times more research funding than ordinary civilian products. Two French examples of this assertion are: ram jets and radar systems.

The ram jet is a jet propulsion system with a nozzle with no moving parts. In 1958 and 1959 it created a sensation at Nord Aviation (which merged with Sud Aviation and the SEREB [Company for Research and Construction of Ballistic Missiles] in 1969, giving rise to Aerospatiale). A prototype equipped with this propulsion system, the Griffon 2, then broke records both in



France and throughout the world. Then came a period of technological monitoring. And now, after a quarter of a century and hundreds of millions of francs invested, the ram jet is apparently about to come into its own. "It is in a good position to meet the new requirements of the military commands," commented engineer general Roger Marguet, a director of ONERA [National Office of Aerospace Studies and Research]. The tactical nuclear missile, Hades, which is to be the successor of the Pluton, might use this propulsion system. Other types of missiles could also use this system, as well as some aircraft. In the United States, NASA is very interested in this new mode of propulsion. And perhaps one day, there may be a new generation of civilian supersonic aircraft using such a system.

#### Delay

In the field of radar, we will cite the case of the RDI [Pulsed Doppler Radar], to be used on the Mirage 2000. An exploratory development was begun at the very start of the 1970s by Thomson-CSF. But, according to the DGA, this development had to be interrupted for several years "for purely budgetary considerations." During this time, the United States continued to study this system and made further progress. After a belated realization of the system's importance, the French general staff not only renewed its interest in the RDI, but in 1976 asked Thomson to develop it as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, time lost can not be regained. The development of such a system, which will cost nearly a half billion francs, will take about 10 years. That is why the first Mirage 2000 which the Air Force units are now beginning to get are flying with RDM [Multifunction Doppler Radar] systems. The performance of these systems is clearly inferior to the performance of the U.S. equipment used on Grumman's F14 jets or on the McDonnell Douglas F15 and F18. The RDI will not be operational until 1985. The Antilope 5, the third radar version to be used on the Mirage 2000, designed jointly by Thomson and Serge Dassault Electronics for very low altitude penetration missions and for the employment of the nuclear ASMP [Air to Surface Medium Range] missile, will not be ready until 1986. That is the price we pay for national independence, people will say. It is true that France has chosen to remain independent of almost everyone for its security. And consequently, the range of its products extends from an assault rifle to a missile-launching frigate, from a combat aircraft to armored vehicles which can be outfitted with either a caterpillar track system or wheels, as desired, from enriched uranium to an anti-airfield bomb, or even the neutron bomb, if that should be required. Some interest has also been shown in antiradiation equipment and in bacteriological warfare. This choice of national independence has four consequences.

## The Leaders in Arms Sales

	Arms Revenue in 1981 (billions of francs)	Amount of Exports in this Figure (Percentage)
Thomson-CSF	14	63
Aerospatiale	10.8	55
Dassault-Breguet	10	73
DTCN [Technical Directorate for Naval Construction]	10	6.6
CEA [Atomic Energy Commis- sion]	6.5*	
GIAT [Ground Weapons Indus- trial Group]	6.1	38*
SNECMA [National Corporation for Aircraft Engine Design and Construction]	3.4	53
Matra	3.1	68
SNPE [National Propellants and Explosives Company]	1.2	33
Manurhin	1.1	73

\* Estimate

With a growth of 10 percent a year for a decade, Thomson holds a leading position in the world in large radar systems, avionics, weapon systems (Crotale), and sonar systems. The same is true of Aerospatiale's position for helicopters and missiles (Exocet, Roland). And Dassault's Mirage aircraft explain the high volume of sales of SNECMA engines and Matra missiles.

The first consequence of France's policy of national independence: imports of a military nature are cut to about 1 billion francs a year (the last large equipment imported was Boeing KC 135 refueling aircraft for the Air Force, and the Crusader intercept aircraft, which are still used on a limited basis on the Foch and Clemenceau aircraft carriers). The next major acquisition will probably be of either the Grumman Hawk-eye or Boeing AWACS radar aircraft to provide low-altitude airborne detection.

### Magnitude

The second consequence of this policy is the magnitude of the investments for developing this hardware. Directing the planning and use of these investments are the DRET [Division of

Research and Technical Studies] and the technical divisions of the DGA, which manage an annual budget of about 17 billion francs, higher than the budgets of our British or German neighbors (who, it is true, do not have to support nuclear development).

The DRET has its own research and study facility, the ETCA. This organization employs 1,600 people, including 350 engineers and management personnel, based at Arcueil, at Le Bouchet (in the Essonne department) and at Gramat (near Rocamadour). In 1982 its orders received amounted to 880 million francs. The bulk of the financial resources devoted to defense is divided among government facilities under the direct authority of the DRET or under its supervision, the universities and the CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research], and industry, by means of contracts. Four sectors absorb by themselves 85 percent of the budgeted spending for research and development: electronics (24.8 percent); nuclear (21 percent); missiles (21.1 percent); and aeronautics (19.1 percent).

In all, over 20,000 people, of whom 3,000 are engineers and scientists, take part in this scientific and technological progress.

#### Competition

The third consequence of this policy: the need to export. This is essential because sales abroad enable the huge costs of developing new equipment to be spread out over a larger number of units. So French weapons, which are designed first of all to defend France's national territory, are also designed to compete technologically with Soviet weapons, which are themselves designed to be competitive with U.S. weapons.

France is in a good position in this commercial battle. According to the latest evaluation made by the SIPRI [Stockholm Peace Research Institute], with a level of \$1.312 billion in 1982 (value: 175), France is responsible for 10 percent of the worldwide arms trade, compared with 8.9 percent in 1981. This proportion is still quite modest in relation to the 37.7 percent of the United States, and 30.4 percent of the Soviet Union. But the military budgets of the two superpowers are 5 times higher than France's budget. And in addition, French military exports are the equivalent of the combined military exports of Great Britain (which France replaced as the third arms exporter in the world about 10 years ago), the Federal Republic of

Germany, and Italy. Without these exports, the deficit in the balance of trade would have been worsened by about 30 billion francs in 1982, the year when orders reached the record level of 41.6 billion francs. To this figure we can add the civilian contracts obtained in conjunction with arms sales.

The fourth consequence: the spinoffs of this military effort on civilian programs. This is a highly controversial subject. The argument used by the opponents of the military-industrial complex: "Look at Japan, which spends only 1 percent of its GNP on defense and still calls the technological tune in a sector as decisive as electronics, while the Soviet Union, the leading world power, if we can believe the Pentagon, is 15 years behind in semiconductors and in business computers." And the response of the supporters of the military-industrial complex: "The ball-point pen, the programmer used in washing machines, and the television screen all came from inventions originally intended for the military." In France, the first "components plan" and the creation of the CII [International Data Processing Company] coincided with France's withdrawal from NATO. The production of slightly enriched uranium by Eurodif for power plants would not have existed without the experience of the upper plant at Pierrelatte, the production center for the highly enriched uranium used for bombs for the strike force. The laser can be used as a "death ray" (and as an antisatellite or antimissile weapon tomorrow), but it can also serve as a surgical knife or a drilling, cutting, or soldering tool in a factory. Thomson-CSF moved quite naturally from piloting simulators for military aircraft to simulators for civilian planes, large merchant ships, or nuclear power plants. In the United States, IBM is selling a computer-aided design program developed by Dassault. The requirements of reliability and compactness needed by the military stimulate inventiveness, investment, and high quality on the part of industrial suppliers. And in addition, the boundary separating civilian and military is often quite slim: in Brazil, the air coverage network being installed by Thomson will be used both by Brazil's fighter aircraft and its commercial airliners.

#### Civilian Developments

"From now on, the contribution of the civilian sector will be most important in the area of materials and methods," feels Mr Carpentier, director of the DRET. We can see examples of this in carbon-carbon and ceramic-ceramic composites. Carbon-carbon composites can be used to improve braking at high temperatures. Now being used for brakes of the production models of the Mirage 2000 and Formula 1 cars, these materials are being tested for

the Airbus A 310. Ceramic-ceramic composites, a newer development, are of interest to automobile manufacturers, who see in these materials the possibility of improving the thermal efficiency and reliability of automobile engines. Aero-spatiale was the first to use composites for the rotor heads of its helicopters.

#### Line of Products

Then, are the French cleverer than other countries in obtaining a maximum of technological dividends from their defense program? Actually, France has benefitted from three major pieces of luck. First, from the decline of Great Britain and the absence of the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan from this competitive race, for both countries have been happy to live under the American umbrella since World War II. Then, France is viewed more favorably by a number of Third World countries, which are disturbed, like General de Gaulle and his successors, about the division of the world into two blocs. And finally, France has been helped by the fact that the equipment offered by the United States and the Soviet Union is often somewhat unsuitable. In addition to the fact that these countries are careful not to sell their latest equipment, their fantastic budgets and their missions have led them to design a very large line of weapons for highly specific uses. Because of their needs and resources, their potential clients often prefer equipment designed for more general purposes.

Another factor that is often not fully grasped is the relatively easy access to some advanced U.S. equipment. Even when U.S. relations with France were not at their best during the 1960s, the Americans did not stop French firms from obtaining electronic components, chemical products, or measurement devices used for producing weapons. The one big exception was the White House's refusal to approve the sale of a large computer to the Atomic Energy Commission. The use of American equipment is still continuing. When the imported component is judged to be essential, the army requires that it be "Francisized." This policy leads to a certain amount of "controlled technological delay."

However, it is certainly true that if French products were out of date, they would not have created a place for themselves in the arms export market. The Iraqi general staff would not allow itself to be surpassed by the Iranians, the Indians by the Pakistanis, and Argentina by Chile. The long hesitation of the Belgian and Dutch governments between the U.S. F16 and Dassault's Mirage during negotiations for the "contract of the

century," the effectiveness of Aerospatiale's Exocet missiles against British ships during the Falklands War, and the huge naval contracts signed by Saudi Arabia, are all reassuring factors.

The Weight of the Military (in percentage of sales by sector)

Aeronautic construction	69
Industrial electronics	65
CEA/nuclear industry	50
Naval construction (civilian shipyards)	6

Problem number one: the magnitude of the financing needed to stay in the race. As a joke, a Pentagon expert said recently that, at the current rate of increase, the U.S. Air Force in 20 years would only be able to afford to buy one combat aircraft per year. The French SA 90, which is to succeed the Crotale weapon system, will have cost 4 billion francs before the first production unit is ready in 1993 or 1994.

As the government is gradually reducing its contribution to research and study costs, the amount of money that must be paid by businesses in the competitive sector is rapidly outstripping their financing possibilities. That is why cooperation is being used in order to share both costs and risks (while realizing quite clearly that a program conducted by several parties costs overall 15 to 20 percent more than if it had been conducted by a single country). And still, partners must be found.

An association with the Germans had been considered for a new tank, the EPC [Principal Combat Vehicle] under President Giscard d'Estaing. But in the end no agreement was reached, and Germany worked alone on the development of its Leopard II. And France is also to build a new armored vehicle. Its prime contractor will be the GIAT, and more specifically, the AMX-APX facility at Satory. The cost of this development will be between 2 and 2.8 billion francs. Some civilian spinoffs are possible in the areas of diesel engines, steels, optics, etc.

Compromises

Though there will be no Franco-German tank, there will most likely be a combat helicopter developed jointly by the two countries. Still, it does seem difficult to find a compromise acceptable to both armed forces. The Federal Republic of Germany

wants an all-weather antitank combat helicopter equipped with third-generation missiles. France prefers the formula of a helicopter providing support and protection for antihelicopter combat, to be armed with guns or longer-range missiles, and, perhaps later, an antitank version. Disturbed by the cost overruns of the Tornado program, the Germans have been tempted to buy from the United States or to join in association with a U.S. company. The French could do it all by themselves, but for political reasons, want to persuade their neighbor. Now they are moving toward a "standard basic platform" to be provided with "very similar equipment." The cost of the project: 4 billion francs, of which 20 percent will be paid by the industries involved, which will certainly include Aerospatiale, MBB [Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm], Turbomeca, and MTU [Motoren und Turbinen Union]. The big new feature will be the high percentage of composites used in the structure of this helicopter (from 30 to 40 percent, compared with a 10 percent level now).

### Composites

Another major uncertainty which involves even larger amounts of money than the helicopter is the future combat aircraft. Dassault has proposed the construction of an experimental aircraft whose first flight would take place in 1986. The ACX would be a twin-jet with a delta wing design, front stabilizer units ("duckbills"), and optimized air intakes. The aircraft structure would make extensive use of composite materials and the plane would integrate advanced digital technology systems (electric flight controls, generalized active control) using "digi-bus" and optical fibers.

This aircraft would be a step in the direction of the development of the combat aircraft of the 1990s, the ACP 95, which will be as multifunctional as possible. "Did you notice that the real-scale model of the ACX shown in the Breguet-Dassault display area at the Le Bourget air show had no French tricolor symbol, unlike its predecessors?" asked Gen Bernard Capillon, the air force chief of staff. We have left behind the time when Dassault could be certain of success by working alone, deriving a newer Mirage from an older Mirage.

Considering the difficulties that France is going to encounter in competing with the two superpowers, there is a temptation: to specialize in a few limited areas (industrial electronics, light armored vehicles, single-engine fighters, sonar systems, etc.), and to buy the rest from the United States. The proponents of this solution claim that the money shifted from military

research to civilian programs would stimulate the economy. What remains to be seen is whether or not this money might be invested in Concorde or spent on consumption. But one thing is certain: while we do know what France would lose in technological dynamism if the armed forces were to cut back on their research programs, we don't know what would be gained in return.

7679

CSO: 3519/587



## PETROCHEMICAL PLANT PLANNED FOR ESSO REFINERY

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 3 Aug 83 p 18

/Text/ According to a government announcement, the Esso Company will be transformed into a mini-petrochemical complex through modernization and expansion of its basic units (PVC, etc.). It will operate under a different name and in such a way as to serve the Greek economy and buttress our oil policy.

Together with the Esso facilities and the Aspropyrgos refineries the state will handle 8 million barrels of oil annually, according to a statement yesterday by Energy Minister Evangelos Kouloumbis who stressed the credo that the main lever to the progress of the complex will be the working people to whom, moreover, the new establishment will belong since they will participate in its management.

Indeed the working people have said in a statement that they will support the complex while the Esso Panhellenic Personnel Union announced yesterday that it is in agreement and fully satisfied with the purchase of the complex (for 15 million dollars). The statement added that the exploitation of the complex provides the political opportunity to prove that the state in cooperation with the working people can competitively manage modern complexes (domestic or international).

Kouloumbis said that no working person will be released and that all personnel will be placed on a voluntary separation from the company. He added that 3 to 5 persons are expected to leave for personal reasons and that the technical training, wages and salaries of the 1,100 people working in Esso are more than the average of those in other companies.

For the effective future operation of the complex, the minister cited the following preconditions:

To the greatest degree possible less interference in the company's structure and cadres; continuation of the enterprise's operation with private-economic criteria; avoidance of bureaucratic interference; provisions of insurance for personnel and participation of the working people in the administration.

In response to criticism by the ND, Kouloumbis said that purchasing Esso was the best solution under the best possible conditions. "We bought it for 15 million dollars. If it were nationalized, Esso would collect more than 50 million dollars. If ND has a better solution, let it propose it."

The transfers of Esso shares will be made on 10 September and the state will take over at the end of October. The decisions for the policy to be followed and for the studies for each company of the complex will be taken by the end of the year.

7520

CSO: 3521/411

## BRIEFS

PRICE RISE IN MADEIRA--The Regional Government of Madeira, in special session last Monday, approved price increases for fuels, flour, bread, electricity, and transportation. According to official sources, the reasons justifying this decision are "the need to bring up to date the prices still prevailing for certain items in the Autonomous Region" and "increases in cost components due to the inflation imported by Madeira." Thus, premium gasoline will go up to 60 escudos per liter and regular to 61. Electricity, although going up less than 30 percent, is still below prices prevailing on the Mainland. With respect to transportation, ferry passages between Madeira and Porto Santo and inter-urban bus fares were raised 33 percent, and local bus fares went up between 11 percent and 50 percent. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 30 Jul 83 p 14] 12430

1981 ECONOMIC PLAN RESULTS--The 1981 results of the Government's economic and financial policies "fell far short of the goals that had been set for that year," the National Planning Council stated in its Official Opinion attached to the Annual Plan Report, released this week. The inflation for that year in fact reached 20 percent, instead of the expected 16 percent. The current transactions account showed a deficit of 2.7 billion dollars, as against an expected deficit of 1.7 billion. Overall formation of fixed capital rose at the rate of 4.6 percent rather than the expected 8 percent. Investments in the State-owned businesses sector achieved 89.4 percent fulfillment. The Council's Official Opinion also notes "the weak growth of productive investment and the consequent negative effects on the level of employment." Furthermore, the Council mentions that the goal of reducing the public budget deficit was likewise not achieved, the total deficit in the public sector having risen to 160 billion escudos. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 30 Jul 83 p 14] 12430

POST, TELEPHONE RATES INCREASE--The new rates set this week by the Cabinet for the CTT/TLP [expansion unknown] will go into effect on 1 August. Note that those rates had already been increased in March of this year. The newly approved increases of 25 to 52 percent are to "implement the understanding that communications activities must be self-supporting within State Budget subsidies," the government's communique states. For their part, the CTT/TLP declare that these rate increases are "in addition to those allowed on 1 March." In any case, starting next week, each telephone call will cost 5.50 escudos, instead of the old rate of 4.40, and each letter will need a stamp of 16.00 escudos instead of 12.50. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 30 Jul 83 p 14] 12430

CSO: 3542/194

## EEC ENTRY BID DAMAGING TO POLITICAL, ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 27 Jul 83 p 2

[Article by Pablo Martin Laborda]

[Text] On the sixth anniversary of Spain's application for membership in the Common Market, an analysis of our present situation is called for. The results could not be worse for Spain's commercial and political interests, although those responsible for the negotiations may deny this. Here we explain why.

Now that it has been 6 years since Spain asked to join the EEC (and not 5 years, as the future minister Manuel Marin, out of ignorance of the Spanish-EEC brief, wrote in DIARIO 16, page 2, last 16 June), and after 7 long months of failures by the current negotiating team, Spain finds herself at the worst moment of the negotiations now in progress with the EEC.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not functioning. It is dragging along after the EEC; it lacks a program, a plan of action, a set of tactics, a strategy. It is in complete disorder, as well as incoherent and ineffective, with respect to style, form and content. The result is failure. The ministry has failed to close a single chapter of the 11 still outstanding: customs union and free circulation of merchandise, fiscal measures, social affairs, the ECSC, EURATOM fishing rights, domestic resources, foreign relations, institutional affairs, patents and agricultural policy.

"Pirineos" Marin

Secretary Marin is handing out sweets like a peddler at the village market place, such as, for example: "During these last months, we have managed to fulfill 90 percent of the proposed plan, which provided for maximum progress in the negotiations....," or this politico-diplomatic jewel: "One day we will be able to see where the real obstacles were to Spanish-EEC negotiations...." Marin dixit. Moran, who continues in office as minister of foreign affairs, remains mum.

Obviously, there is an 'ad hominem' issue. With Marin we will never make it into the EEC. It is a prior condition, like those EEC members call non-

negotiable. The Jekyll and Hyde contortions through which the Spanish minister of foreign affairs puts himself are grotesque. Vis-a-vis the EEC he adopts the superficial form of Jekyll's maximalist policy, while at bottom, he adopts the minimalist theory of the kindly Mr Hyde.

If one examines the archives at foreign affairs, one can hardly find any more anti-economic nonsense than that which sets the minister at odds with his number two man. Moran says: "Relations with France cannot be improved." Marin replies: "The greatest threat to membership is France." Moran declares: "France is politically helpful to Spanish membership." Marin replies: "The commission's document was written by the French, and is very hard-line against Spain's interests."

Independently of the fact that anyone might suppose that Fernando Moran is "possessed of the French whimsy" (obviously in the political sense), and that Manuel Marin is a good deputy for Ciudad Real, or perhaps better yet an outstanding member of the board of directors of the extremely powerful Spanish Hydrocarbons Institute [IEH], those polyvalent, moonlighting, and well-paid hats which he wears on a part-time basis, it is clear that Moran has made a gift to Marin of his European suit, and as evidence would have it, it is too long and wide for him, so that he has cloth to spare, and he can be seen making a fool of himself in the various cabinet offices, where he sometimes makes as if to enter and sometimes as if to leave, like a bull in a china shop. Even the maternal Inger Nielsen (adjutant director general in charge of the amplification delegation) has publicly reprimanded Secretary Marin.

At bottom, the negotiations have violated three fundamental principles, and the proceedings are adrift without a compass, heading wherever the wind may carry them. The negotiations are no longer general. One negotiates under unacceptable prior conditions. And thirdly, different transitory periods are being accepted. What are the consequences of these violations? A disorderly negotiation that is moving in directions primarily beneficial to the EEC's member countries.

#### Impositions

Spain must not accept three prior conditions, by which for one reason or another she acts as hostage or bait. These prior conditions are: the political one, imposed by Great Britain: "Spain shall not become a member of the EEG until restrictions at the Gibraltar border have been lifted completely." (Margaret Thatcher speaking before the House of Commons); the economic condition, used by the "ten" at the European Council of Stuttgart, when the council ties membership to amplification of domestic resources. This, Moran-Marin is a prior condition, and far from being a success, it is an absolute calamity. Finally, there is the sectoral condition, by which fresh fruit and vegetables, olive oil, and wine, are excised from Spanish agriculture. This is non-negotiable. It is reasonable to suppose that the Spanish minister of agriculture, fisheries, and nutrition, who up to now has blended with the wallpaper, will open his mouth and defend the interests of Spain's farmers, because otherwise it would be reasonable to "excise" him, just as the EEC intends to excise four of the basic products which make up approximately 40 percent of our production.

Concerning the transitory periods, their dispersal and fragmentation causes notorious harm to a single party negotiating in isolation against the "ten," as compared to two contracting parties who have a single transitory period as their goal.

#### Reflection

Deep reflection is required on the negotiations now in progress, and actions must be taken quickly. We should not fall into the easy temptation of throwing away 53 months of negotiations, money, dreams and goals. We should not, in case such an offer is made, accept membership by degrees, whether via excisions in the agricultural sector, or even worse, by membership in a customs union good only for the industrial sector.

It seems to me that EEC agencies and member countries have incurred a historical responsibility for their covert rejection of Spain's membership (enough of empty promises of support that never materialize into specific steps). Spain should finish the process begun 6 years ago, a process that represents the essential chapter of our foreign policy. In order for this to happen, it is necessary to reconduct the negotiations, change the negotiating team, and, in the final stages, move the responsibility for membership to the president's office in the political sphere, with the advice, in technical matters, of a small group of branch experts, led by a minister close to the president.

9839

CSO: 3548/479

## OVERVIEW OF FIRST-QUARTER EMPLOYMENT IN ALAVA

Guipuzcoa EGIN in Spanish 24 Jul 83 p 7

[Text] Official unemployment statistics for Alava, as recorded by the Provincial Office of Labor and Social Security at the end of the first half of 1983, indicate a decline in the number of unemployed persons of 256, in absolute terms with respect to 31 December 1982, when the year closed with a total of 14,070 unemployed as against 13,805 officially unemployed at the end of last June.

This piece of information, which apparently reflects continuing unemployment in Alava since the point in 1982 when unemployment rose to 2,654, should be taken with considerable reservations, since the decline was largely due to an updating of the files for Alava at INEM [expansion unknown] during the month of February. This purging of the files presumed a spectacular decline of 800 in the number of officially unemployed persons, a decline which did not reflect any objective return to jobs.

As a consequence, and even supposing this readjustment to be strictly statistical (unemployed persons no longer living in Alava, individuals who did not appear before the INEM when called to confirm their unemployment status, etc.), and of no further significance, unemployment in Alava would have risen in fact, during the first semester of 1983, by a total of 535. This would be a more correct, and in any case a benevolent, interpretation.

One must nevertheless recognize that during the first half of last year, there was an increase of 1,165 unemployed over 31 December 1981. This indicates at least that during this year there has been a slowing of unemployment's growth based on the following progression: January, an increase of 118 unemployed; February, decline of 800 (based on readjustment or updating of files); March, an increase of 530; April, an increase of 49; May, an increase of 20; and June, a reduction of 176 unemployed, always in relation to the absolute figures for the preceding month.

Youth Unemployment 4,328

A breakdown by economic sectors also offers some interesting conclusions which bring industry and previously unemployed youths to the forefront.

While employment recovery in the industrial sector has been constant, to the point of achieving an overall decline with respect to December 1982 of 1,764 unemployed (including 443 removed from the lists by updating of files at INEM), the number of those seeking their first job has increased to 1,475 during the same period.

It should be emphasized that in the industrial sector, for the month of May, there was an increase of 10 unemployed, in contrast to the successive reductions in unemployment of the five remaining months. Of special significance was the decline of 1,036 in the unemployment rolls for this sector during the month of March.

For individuals with previous employment records, on the other hand, this was the worst month, with an increase of 847. In construction and services, even though the final balance at the end of the semester is positive, with a decline of 345 and 382 respectively, one must nevertheless speak in general terms of a leveling out of employment rates once the "bonus" due to the February updating of files is discounted. This "bonus" consisted of 425 fewer unemployed in construction and 263 in the service sector. Month by month, the fluctuation in employment rates in both sectors is quite irregular, showing extreme ups and downs.

#### Job Cancellations via Legal Proceedings Decline

The unemployment problem in Alava merits a second look, as legal proceedings arising from crisis situations this semester ceased to be the main source of unemployment. During this period, only 248 jobs were called via legal proceedings of employment adjustment, as opposed to 949 such cancellations during the same period last year. This means that cancellations of low-level jobs are being processed in ever greater numbers by IMAC [expansion unknown] through dismissal of personnel. The other side of the coin is that the number of workers affected by temporary contract suspensions during this first semester has tripled in comparison with the first half of last year: 1,003 individuals were so affected in the first half of 1982, as opposed to 3,344 in 1983 (first half). The increase in those affected by legal proceedings to reduce the number of working hours has also been comparatively significant.

With respect to the number of legal actions instituted and decided during the two semesters here being compared, the number has dropped from 26 in the first half of 1982 to an average of 19 in 1983.

In general terms, and by way of conclusion, it can be said that during the first half of the present year, there has been a significant slowdown in the growth of official unemployment in Alava, and while it is impossible to speak in the strict sense of a real decline in the number unemployed, there has been a strong tendency toward zero growth, and thus toward the beginnings of a recovery in employment. The next few months will have the final word, when it is known with greater certainty whether this tendency will continue and grow.

9839

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## NORDIC COUNTRIES' AID PROGRAMS UNDERGOING CHANGES

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 10 Aug 83 p 21

[Article by Timo Voipio: "Development Corps Model Taking Shape; Nordic Countries Share Responsibility with Aid Organizations"]

[Text] Young Finns' increased interest in the developing countries has gotten the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to set plans for a Finnish development aid corps in motion again.

In the past Finland has sent two aid corps out into the world, but when it formed a third one in 1971 there were no longer enough people willing to go. Now the Ministry of Foreign Affairs intends to make certain that interest will be retained by directing development corps activities through those national organizations in whose ranks interest in aid affairs is not dying out.

A development corps worker is generally a person from 22 to 35 years old who has received a vocational school, college or university level education, has demonstrated his professional skill on the job and pledges to work in a developing country for at least 2 years. A lower salary and often younger age, among other things, distinguish him from a so-called aid expert.

## Interest Is Decisive

His academic merit, professional skill and amount of work experience determine an aid expert's competence. In choosing development corps workers, special attention is also paid to how the applicant has demonstrated his interest in aid affairs before.

The Development Corps Committee appointed by the government has familiarized itself with the other Nordic countries' experiences with development corps and deliberated as to the extent and operating principles of development corps that might be organized in Finland.

## Organizational Efforts with Government Funds

Denmark was the first Nordic country to create an operational development corps administered by national organizations and funded by the government. That model has also later proved to be the most effective one.

In Denmark Mellemlfolkelig Samvirke (MS) [International Cooperation], a union of numerous national organizations engaged in development aid, is responsible for the choice of aid workers, their training, the choice of developing countries targeted for aid, practical administration and the evaluation of experiences obtained.

On the basis of MS proposals, the government decides to which countries development corps workers will be sent. Otherwise, the government's role is limited to the appropriation of funds. According to Peter Jensen, who heads Danish development corps activities, this has proven to be the best solution since the government can best work together with local residents and populations, on whose active cooperation the success of all development projects depends, through the national organizations. According to the rules of international diplomacy, the government is obligated to cooperate with the government of the target country.

#### Assistance of Organizations Is Effective

In Finland critics of development aid are almost unreservedly unanimous in maintaining that a larger portion of Finnish aid funds than before should be channeled through national and missionary organizations. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs too, they consider development corps activities to be an appropriate way of sharing the responsibility with development aid organizations.

The Finnish Red Cross, Finnish Missionary Society, Peace Defenders, Church Foreign Aid, UN Alliance and Emmaus and Corvee Commission are the biggest of the appropriate organizations and those which have already established joint advisory agencies with many smaller countries.

In Sweden and Norway the development corps are still administered by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, but as separate departments.

#### Inexpensive Development Aid

One agronomist, nurse, bookkeeper or engineer working in Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zimbabwe or Zambia costs the Danish Government 190,000 kroner (over 100,000 markkas) a year. The Swedes and Norwegians get by with a little less.

An aid worker himself earns about 4,000 markkas a month in wages and special "safari supplements." (Danes and Norwegians get a little more, Swedes a little less than that.)

At present one aid expert costs the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs about 250,000 markkas a year. His average 13,000-markka monthly wage and the supplements that go with it account for the lion's share of expenses in employing an expert.

All things considered, sending aid workers is an inexpensive form of development aid for the country that sends them since the other Nordic countries, for example, have succeeded in keeping the percentage of volunteer workers in

the administration of their development corps fairly large. The cost of Denmark's 320 aid workers amounts to about 1 percent of Denmark's entire development aid budget.

#### Task of Training and Education

Nordic development corps directors stress the importance of preliminary training. During an approximately 3-month training period Sweden, Norway and Denmark familiarize the people they send out with the language, the conditions and customs of the target country as well as with the necessary special skills from the standpoint of the jobs they have to do.

Furthermore, included in the qualification requirements is the condition that the aid worker should want to share and be capable of sharing his knowledge and experiences with other Finns after 2 years in the developing country. Training in internationalism, which returning aid workers pass on in schools, universities, at workplaces, in parishes and organizations, plays an important role in Denmark's MS activities.

The mission of the Finnish Development Corps Committee, headed by Hilikka Pietila, is to present a clearcut proposal by next January as to whether Finland should create a new development corps and how, where and under whose supervision it would operate.

According to committee secretary Jouni Mutanen, the goal is to get an appropriation into the 1984 budget for the drafting of development corps activities so that the first group would be sent into the field by as early as 1985, if they so decide.

#### UN Development Corps As an Alternative

An alternative to the creation of our own development corps would be for Finland to considerably expand its role in development corps activities. So far about 10 young Finns a year, whose wages are paid by Finland, have served on UN Volunteer Organization (UNV) projects.

Finnish experiences with the UNV have not been entirely favorable. Despite a giant organizational structure, that organization has been nowhere near capable of making sufficiently effective use of its work force of over 1,000 volunteers and their professional skills.

UNV director Sean Finn, who has visited Finland, understands the Nordic countries' desire to send their own aid workers to their own familiar program countries. Finn, however, stresses the fact that UNV financial support is nonetheless important because UN aid workers constitute a significant opportunity for training people, especially the young people of the developing countries. Over 80 percent of the UN aid workers at present come from developing countries.

## Work for Civil Servants in Finland

The Development Corps Committee will probably also assume a position on the often proposed idea of employing civil servants in development corps jobs. The Civil Service Commission, which has been meeting under the direction of department head K.J. Lang, does not recommend sending civil servants to the developing countries. According to Lang, it would, however, be an excellent idea to organize development aid assignments for civil servants in Finland, for example, in connection with church or national organization aid for development campaigns.

11,466

CSO: 3617/165

EUROCOMMUNIST ORGAN: CP CHAIRMAN STILL WANTS POPULAR FRONT

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 5 Aug 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Popular Front and Kajanoja"]

[Text] To launch the fall season, the Center Party's chief organ, SUOMENMAA, has interviewed SKP [Finnish Communist Party] chairman Jouko Kajanoja on current political problems.

The newspaper gave the full-page item the headline: "Jouko Kajanoja: 'No Return to a Popular Front'."

One would consider that statement very strange, coming from a party leader who during the four postwar decades has retained a Left-Center coalition, a so-called popular front, as his primary objective.

When we read the interview, it becomes clear that Kajanoja did not say that at all. He spoke at great length about the conservative tendencies that can now be observed and which he feels have greatly increased, particularly in the Social Democratic Party, and are appearing in the current government policy.

He announced that a popular front coalition is still what the Communists are striving for. "We feel that in terms of policy a Left-Center coalition is unquestionably the best alternative."

This is why we may state that Jouko Kajanoja did not reassess his party's political policy in the way in which one might assume he had on the basis of the newspaper's headline.

11,466  
CSO: 3617/165

## COMMENTS ON DEVELOPMENTS, LEADERSHIP ISSUE IN KKE

## Reported Displeasure With Moscow

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek No 782, 28 Jul 83 p 12

/Excerpt/ The position of KKE is generally regarded as very difficult lately and especially in view of Moscow's stand on the bases' issue.

The triple approval of the Soviets for Papandreou's handling of the bases' issue--two broadcasts by Tass and one by Moscow Radio--brought Florakis to desperation, who is trying with "confused" actions to save a semblance of prestige among the masses.

A KKE cadre, expressing his disappointment with Moscow's stand, said "we would disobey Moscow's suggestion. But why didn't they give it to us without publicity? The feeling that a direct channel exists between Papandreou and the Kremlin is painful for us. It is also worrisome. Wherever such channels operated, as in Nasser's Egypt, Assad's Syria, Qadhafi's Libya, etc., the communists become the pawns to be sacrificed..."

Indeed, Moscow's stand allowed the government to insult and challenge KKE openly. PASOK's partisan press--the other pro-government newspapers do not follow this line to protect their circulation--ridicules and disparages KKE with ironic comments. The same course is followed by KKE-Int. and AVGI.

On the surface, KKE keeps cool and tries to give the impression that it maintains its fighting opposition against the bases, with sparse gatherings and lukewarm articles. But now "everybody knows." In any event, the communist instructors at the grass roots are repaying PASOK by ridiculing and insulting Papandreou.

## Alleged Changes in Rank and File

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 1 Aug 83 p 5

/Article by Akis Kosonas/

/Excerpts/ It appears that as time goes by things will get tougher for KKE. It will not be the "international imperialism" nor "the war of the bourgeoisie

against the progressive movement," which will be fighting against the party; it will be the party's very followers, those of course who already have raised certain issues, those who the party will not hesitate to accuse of "factionalism" and "anti-party activity" at the first opportunity.

Against a reasoning that may propose something else, KKE of course will put up its "basic principles." But the questions have been raised, particularly difficult questions which existed always but which were never "legitimized" and were never able to form "a common view." Their nature and their quality are such that they touch on the holy aspects of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy.

/They are/ questions and "suspicions", not merely related to issues of inter-party democracy; they are dangerous and unhealthy because they deal not only with the form but also the content of an organization which until now has been relying for its survival on the ignorance of the many. The reports say that, even though a "common view" has not been formed as yet by the "doubters" there is a general tendency to probe, especially after the recent expulsion of four cadres.

The ignorance and mysticism, one of the main elements of KKE's rise, is coming intensely under question, creating a very unpleasant climate within the party's ranks. Already, in several primary party organizations, members demanded to have the matter of the expulsion brought up for discussion. But also in leadership levels (but not of course within the Politbureau) the issue is being discussed and brings the divisions to the surface...KKE is not persecuted by anyone. The only "threat" comes from its own followers. This, of course, is a greater threat than that from the "class enemy" (which often gave KKE the opportunity to gain a large following), since the party does not have to fight against someone, but to answer questions and doubts. The differences which emerge daily in KKE seldom become public...It will be a mistake to search for "conflicting lines" within the leadership. What we certainly have are trends. Thus, what is seen as a "line" differing from the official line is nothing but the trends which outline the leading group. The three names mentioned by reliable circles as being representative of the trends are those of Tsolakis, Farakos, and Florakis. We should consider Tsolakis as the guardian of the partisan traditions and a model of preservation of the party machinery. Farakos, who is regarded by many as the successor to the post of secretary, is seen as the "intellectual expression of dogmatism." Moscow has some reservations about him because of his heretical views in 1956.

Florakis, finally, is regarded as the best political brain among the KKE leaders, distinguished by flexibility and a popular instinct and judgment. This does not mean he expresses a disposition toward renewal or liberalization. On questions of in-party democracy he is equally unbending as the other two. The desire for "something new" must be sought outside of the "untouchable ground" of the Politbureau, but certainly within the Central Committee. When we talk about something new or "something else" let us not

think about any spectacular democratic openings or liberal structures. Such sinful thoughts belong to isolated cadres who are subject to the rules of self-censorship.

The "new" is nothing else than modernization, a modernization which is related to KKE's power structure, on the minimum issues which the party has accepted as necessary.

#### Differentiations in KNE

The vanguard relationship of the youth to the party, which was evident since the fall of the dictatorship, has long disappeared. Today the Greek Communist Youth /KNE/ is entirely different from that of 1972-74 but also from that of 1974-77. Sometime in 1977 we can place the timing of the decisive change in KNE structure. The change of the KNE role, its (natural) downgrading and the withdrawal of a large part of the anti-dictatorial generation gave KNE different boundaries and a new profile. KNE ceased to be the source of new ideas and proposals as its tasks turned into manual labor. It was limited to carrying out the decisions of the party--and the KNE leadership turned into the ghost writer of the speeches for the Politbureau members...

The KKE decision to look for followers in the countryside was not unfortunate at all. The countryside had been for years practically hostile to KKE, yet after the fall of the dictatorship it showed a tendency to come close to the party. There are many reasons for this change, but that's another story.

In any event, it was neither KKE's policy nor its slogans that attracted the reserved inhabitants of the small towns. Much of this success is due to the absence of others in a given area. The daily contact with the people, the setting of cultural clubs, the organizing of sport events, gave something new to people who had always connected politics with their local deputy. KKE with a different handling, the personal contact with people given high priority, began to be established as "something different". And we all know that something different always attracts. The party benefited considerably. It appears that the countryside contributes "better" followers; with fewer questions, less informed, therefore, good followers. Also, the myth of clandestine action which was promoted for years paid off at a given moment.

In the context of attracting new followers, and in view of the fact that recruitment has declined to a disturbing degree (especially in the large cities) the party does not hesitate to invoke its basic principles, thus depriving the follower and the thinking cadre of the opportunity to act constructively on the political and ideological level...The stubborn insistence on the "basic principles" and the traditional heritage cannot be regarded as a factor of modernization. KKE cannot persuade anyone about the sincerity of its governmental objectives because it does not want, but also does not know, the method that would allow it to become a partner in the government.



## Stalinist Tendencies

Reliable reports confirm the existence in the KNE leadership of a neo-Stalinist tendency which constitutes the hard core and antipode to the innovators who talk about a dialogue with the Left outside of KKE. This tendency, which is in most part expressed by the remaining members of the anti-dictatorial generation, has as its main point of reference the struggle to keep the communist orthodoxy (with the continuous struggle to blot out the renovating tendencies at the ideological level) and the critical questioning of the old who are identified with the party. The representatives of this trend have declared a "struggle against the gerontocracy" and they try to convince everyone about their position and to support their position, referring to the success of the youth against the dictatorship "when the leadership had abandoned them." This tendency expresses the radical version of the Stalinist mentality, drawing its theoretical foundation from the ideological writings of East Germany which in their view remains loyal to Marxism-Leninism and "continues to produce results..."

The self-censorship to which the more or less thinking followers are subject has started to be inadequate for their ideological balance (and not only just that). Even among the militant members of KNE some questioning has begun, which begins to appear more clearly than before. A lot of people are looking for solutions outside the stereotypes of the leadership, agonizing, searching, but staying in the party ranks. Behind the annual festivals contradictions and differences are hidden. The preservation of the party's monolithic facade, by all means, is "threatened" by all those who have started to ask themselves "what are they protecting and from whom."

## Florakis Succession

Athens | VRADYNI in Greek 2 Aug 83 p 14

/Text7 The question of replacing Florakis at the KKE leadership was raised yesterday while a struggle was launched by the prospective successors who are trying to win over cadres and party organizations.

The reports that a "Florakis issue" exists were supported by a news story yesterday that the KKE secretary general was planning to ask for a vote of confidence in an extraordinary session of the Central Committee.

KKE circles attributed these reports, which come from sources of the extreme Left, to a conspiracy outside the party ranks, designed to cause harm to the party.

## What Did They Discuss?

At the same time they did not deny the meeting of a Central Committee session, neither did they give any information about the reason for it. They claimed, however, that the subject of the session will have no relation to the

article about the intentions of Florakis. According to the article the initiative for the Central Committee session came from Florakis who wanted to be "rebaptized" in the leadership and "clear up" the in-party issues following his recent views in favor of giving amnesty to the leaders of the dictatorship as well as his different position on the issue of the bases (plebiscite) from that of Moscow.

In the "war of succession" the protagonists are Fazakos and Tsolakis who had sought in the past the post of secretary general of KKE and who have strong groups of supporters. Gr. Farakos is considered to be the strongest. He advocates that the party must be renewed and be ridden of "the rusted brains." Farakos is supported by Kolozof whose rise in the Central Committee in the last few years was very rapid.

#### Florakis Line Seen Winning

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 3 Aug 83 p 8

/Text/ During the two-day session of the KKE Central Committee the views of Florakis won out according to the official statement on its proceedings. Of course, the statement tried to cover up the responsibilities of those who moved against Florakis and instead it placed the blame on a "many-sided attack on KKE, its leadership, and especially its Secretary General Kh. Florakis." According to the statement, the Central Committee met to discuss: "Problems in the ideological sector," namely, what line to follow, a policy of complete disassociation from PASOK or a policy of continuing side by side until an opportunity comes for supporting a Papandreou cabinet with the participation of communist ministers.

At the same time the Central Committee discussed the agreement for the bases and after declaring anew its opposition to it, it added that the present Chamber of Deputies cannot approve the agreement since it was elected under the slogan against the bases.

In any event, it is noteworthy that the criticism against PASOK was mild and this further indicates that Florakis must have won out.

7520  
CSO: 3521/406

## PASOK SUSPECTED OF FAVORING RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 10 Aug 83 p 1

/Article by Giorgos Delastik/

/Excerpts/ The "file with the single columns" could be journalistically named as that of the EEC-Greece-Israel "triangle" which is kept in half darkness, with a dose of mystery or suspense as in the movies.

It is doubtful that more than 5 percent of those who read the Sunday newspapers last week noticed the insignificant, single-column report that "Premier Papandreou, in his capacity as Chairman of the EEC Council, received the president of the World Jewish Council E. Bromfman and the president of the Central Council of Greek Jews I. Lovinger." We wonder if more people read the four lines of a single-column report by the Associated Press which said the EEC worries about the Greek government's pro-Arab policy are now reduced. Or some other single-column reports with statements by the government spokesman about several agreements signed between Greece and Israel on trade, agriculture, education, information exchange through their news agencies, etc.

Did the "invisible" visit of the secretary of Israel's Foreign Ministry draw any public attention? Or can one say that much publicity was given the point in a single-column report from Brussels (published in ELEVETHEROTYPIA, 11 May) which said: "Well-informed circles in the EEC Council of Ministers" claimed that in exchange for a supposedly more favorable EEC position on the Cypriot problem "the Greek government let it be understood that it will change its position on several subjects (Israel, Middle East, East-West relations) on which it has held until now different views to those of the other members!"

'Painful Situations'

The single-column reports accumulated and suddenly "everything indicates that the Greek-Israeli relations will enter a new phase in the near future" according to the English-language magazine 30 DAYS published in Athens by a well-known female PASOK cadre. It adds without equivocation that "the upgrading of the diplomatic delegations of Greece and Israel appears inevitable." In other words, believe it or not, it is inevitable that the

PASOK government will dare to do what not even the ND government dared to do, that is, to raise to the level of embassy the diplomatic mission of Israel, this criminal state, possibly as a "reward" for the tens of thousands of murders of defenseless Arabs, committed by the Zionist hordes of Begin last year in Lebanon!

Without shame, the pro-government magazine is giving us the reason for this inevitable pro-Zionist development in the policy of the Papandreou government: "The overall EEC policy and the agreements it has pushed forward with the Arab countries and Israel will have increasingly more serious effects on the Greek policy."

The truth is that EEC makes no effort to hide its demand that the PASOK government immediately concludes full diplomatic relations with Israel... This is the "united direction" of the EEC on this issue, and they insist that we, too, must comply. Tragically this is acceptable to the pro-government 30 DAYS, since the magazine claims that Greece, with its new place in international politics, could be in a stronger position to act as a peace-maker in the Middle East if it improved its relations with all interested parties..."

At the summit conference in Stuttgart this summer, EEC most solemnly decided to reward Israel for its achievements. EEC "released" funds amounting to 35.6 million dollars which were frozen last year...The Soviet News Agency, TASS called this an "anti-Arab action," adding that "under these conditions the EEC assistance to Israel means encouragement of the aggressor to embark on new militarist actions and to escalate the tension in the area." The tragic part is that Premier Papandreou himself gave his approval, in effect, for this reward to Israel, by refusing to raise the veto while only a week ago the Greek government, together with Ireland, had blocked an effort to "unfreeze" the aid.

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CSO: 3521/414

## DIVISIONIST TENDENCIES ALLEGED WITHIN PASOK

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 7 Aug 83 p 18

/Excerpt/ The danger of open confrontation in PASOK is now evident as was demonstrated during the discussions of the party's Central Committee. It is underlined now by the reactions against the decision of PASOK's central organ, which takes draconian measures to stop the disagreements. But this is unlikely because those who disagree are radically opposed to the way the party program is being implemented and at the same time are unwilling to become spineless pawns obeying a harsh leadership which only in the communist party has a precedent.

If the intense in-party upheaval continues, matters may go as far as a split with the possible creation of a new party.

Those who disagree put a great deal of blame on Papandreou and the small leading cliques surrounding him. Their charges may be summed up as follows:

Deliberately

1. Deviations from the declared line of the movement. These deviations are due to the incompetence of those who carry out the government policy, the poor selection of cadres that could help the success of the government work, and more importantly the deliberate adjustment of the PASOK policy by the party leadership to established conditions. This means, according to them, that because "power is sweet" Papandreou wants to stay in power and this makes him change course and abandon principles and positions.

Those who disagree do not accept the Maoist theory of "one step forward, two steps backward" which was reflected in the official report of the PASOK Executive Bureau to the Central Committee with the dictum that it is not possible to do "everything here and now." They claim that it was possible to implement the right policy even against any difficulties.

A Serious Matter

Those who disagree do not see many excuses for the failures of the PASOK government. They believe that the cause of change is too serious a matter to be handled with improvizations, with deviations and expedencies not

dictated by objective difficulties, but other reasons unrelated to the real events. The familiar charges about Papandreou's family rule and favoritism based on submission to Kastri /his residence/ should be included in the context of this criticism.

2. The government leadership deliberately and systematically ignores all this displeasure and appears prepared under the cover of a certain self-criticism to continue the same tactic with the result that it disappoints the masses and weakens a great effort which had created such expectations among the people.

There is a significant section among those who disagree, claiming that it is a pity to see people, who gave their soul to the realization of the PASOK goals, now leaving the party. This section appears to regret that other parties will benefit from the support of cadres who were devoted to PASOK and fought hard to bring it to power.

#### Absence of In-party Dialogue

3. The treatment of those who disagree with the party has all the traits of totalitarian mentality.

The decision of the Central Committee notes of course the absence of in-party dialogue but the example for this is given by the report of the PASOK Executive Bureau which was vested with the prestige of a Central Committee resolution and sent out the command: What the members are called to do according to instructions from above "is not subject to negotiation." In other words, there can be no discussion let alone disagreement.

4. Those who disagreed knew or at least expected that harsh measures would be taken to silence their criticism; they also knew that the governing clique was aware of the acute in-party developments which are directed against them. For this reason, the leading group "issued an order" with the hope of holding down those who disagreed and who are being accused of "factionalism" and may soon be accused of being renegades.

Those who disagree claim that such accusations will be the last resort for the leading group to give a bad name to its critics who insist that they act only with an honest desire to stop the downslide. This is possibly related to certain "whispered" allegations that "those who criticize are very likely a foreign body within PASOK," that is, they belong to other party structures and act as agent provocateurs within the governing party.

#### Harsh Criticism

The reactions and criticisms were reflected in all the discussions of the Central Committee where views were expressed that were not pleasing at all to Papandreou and his leading guard.

This criticism, which was open, confirmed the earlier worries of the PASOK leadership which had understood that "something was not going well within the movement" and which is now trying with restrictive measures to get rid of the criticism and to streamline everything in line with its own wishes and choices.

5. Those who disagree did not see "with favor" the weakening of the branch organizations because they understood what this move meant. But they, too, send a "message" that those branch organizations, which will be incorporated within the local organizations, will not stop having and expressing their own views in spite of efforts to "close them in" so they will not be able to "pollute" other members of the base organizations.

#### Unchanged Mentality

6. For those who disagree, the decision of the Central Committee sets new duties for the PASOK members only on the surface, since the leading group has the same goals, the same mentality, and the same weaknesses for the realization of the government objectives. They believe, in view of the situation that has been created for the party after many months in office, that it is necessary to have a reorientation of tactics and work, and above all it is necessary to understand that the margin for improvements and "half measures" has narrowed. This element makes their opposition more acute because they do not see what solution the government leadership can find to change the bad situation.

7. After all this, those who disagree--whose views are shared by PASOK deputies--fear that the situation will eventually be pushed to an open confrontation, but they also foresee that Kastro, to prevent something like this, will resort to expulsions. In such a case--they add--the only way out might be the organization of a separate party which would claim purity of goals and practices for their realization.

#### The KKE Objectives

On the other hand, it is not accidental that both communist parties try to take advantage of the in-party developments within PASOK. This is shown clearly by the fact that the newspapers of the two communist parties said yesterday, in publishing parts of the decision of the PASOK Central Committee, that the decision presents a "positive" assessment of the government's work up to now, but it also notes negative aspects (RISOSPASTIS) and there is "a distance between words and deeds" (AVGI).

It is clear that the two communist parties which are familiar with the situation within PASOK and the effect it has on the masses, are trying to take advantage of PASOK's decline.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

PLO OFFICIAL VISITS KKE

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 10 Aug 83 p 1

/Text/ Salih Ra'fat, member of the Politbureau of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine /DMAP/ and a member of the PLO Central Council met yesterday at the headquarters of the KKE Central Committee with comrades Orestis Kolozov, candidate member of the Politbureau, and Georgios Papapetros, candidate member of the Central Committee. During the meeting the participants informed each other about the situation in Greece and on the recent developments in the area of the Palestinian resistance.

Comrade Salih Ra'fat referred particularly to the problems facing the PLO and the efforts of DMAP, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other progressive Palestinian forces for putting an end to the armed clashes, and for the preservation of the autonomy of the PLO and at the same time for the advancement of the necessary reforms in its ranks.

Comrade Orestis Kolozov assured comrade Ra'fat that KKE will continue to offer its support and solidarity to the cause of the Palestinian people. He also underlined that KKE shares the DMAP's view that to achieve the goals of the Palestinian struggle it is necessary to end the bloody clashes, to find a solution with a constructive dialogue, and to preserve the unity of the PLO.

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## UNDERSTANDING ASKED FROM KKE ON BASES' ISSUE

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 5 Aug 83 p 4

/Article by G. Massavetas/

/Text/ The extraordinary session of the KKE Central Committee is in essence the product of very deep fermentations and reactions in the ranks of the traditional communist Left--in spite of efforts by a section of the press of the Right to present the session as related exclusively to the person of KKE Secretary General Kharilaos Florakis. These reactions are connected to the position held by the party leadership toward the government, following the announcement of the signing of the bases' agreement.

In fact, KKE's tactics toward the government, with the efforts to mobilize and to create a climate of resentment, based on the myth that the government supposedly "betrayed" PASOK's platform declarations, have met with opposition from veteran fighters of the Left. We see in this display of "revolutionary maximalism" a repeat of the unrealistic assessments which led to tragic mistakes in the past.

Of course, no fighter of the traditional Left believes that the "special conditions" which justify tactical maneuvers in other cases apply to any other ideologically related government, but not to their own country. This is a basic characteristic of the stand held by the KKE leadership and its publications on this matter.

They accept the special reasons, conditions, circumstances, and tactical expediency which force the revolutionary Communist Cuba of Fidel Castro to refrain from the removal or to press for a timetable to get rid of the Guantanamo base. And indeed, all of us can understand the reasons why Castro does not "hit his fist on the knife" in spite of the 30 years of his revolutionary regime and the elimination of every internal subversive activity.

They also justify just as easily the "tactical maneuvers" of the Soviet Union which, to gain time and prepare to confront Nazism, signed the well-known Ribentrop-Molotov agreement. They easily see in this the difference between tactical moves and strategic goals.

But when you "understand" so eagerly these tactical maneuvers and necessary retreats from declared principles because these are special conditions, how can you close your eyes to the special conditions which determine the tactical course of your own country? Or is it that NATO and the Americans suddenly ceased being a threat to Greece with their methods and with the Turkish imperialism as their pawn? Did Greece suddenly acquire a more secure, less vulnerable socialist regime with a parliamentary governmental change of 21 months, than that which Cuba has after 3 decades and the Soviet Union had after a quarter century of revolutionary socialist power?

These questions, of course, preoccupy the communist voters as well as the organized members of the communist Left, at least those who are always ready for the work-therapy of the mobilizations without logic or restraint. In any event, they must have enough memory to understand that the famous argument that PASOK has changed its policy on the bases is false. They read and heard what PASOK Chairman A. Papandreou said about the removal of the bases; what he said about the impossibility of removing the bases from one day to the next; what he promised to the people, the conservative voters whose electoral shift brought to power the Socialist Left. In other words, in handling this issue there will be no hasty or ill-considered moves exposing to danger the country's security and defense capability.

All Greeks heard those things. And they took them into account when they voted for the specific change PASOK promised them and not for the so-called "real change" advertised by KKE calling on its followers to avoid imitations as though it was speaking about detergents. Together with the other Greeks, the KKE followers read them and certainly remember them. For this reason they cannot join in an anti-government campaign based on a distortion of reality. For this reason we see the disagreements, the expulsions, the unrest in the ranks of the most strictly organized political party.

We lived so many years with the bases, we could have another 2 or 3 years said Florakis and he was right. Naturally, in KKE's organizations now there are some who express doubts when they are called to "dynamic mobilizations." Is the question, in other words, that the 2 or 3 years will become 5 or 6 and not the fact that the way is now open to put an end to a regime of dependence that had lasted for decades?

These questions, which come "from below" and which are shared to some extent by some in the KKE leadership--with Florakis himself at the forefront--led to the extraordinary session of the KKE Central Committee. Certainly the show of realism by TASS must have contributed to this. TASS showed much more realism than that shown by a group in the leadership of the KKE Athens Party Organization.

Beyond whatever formal results of the extraordinary session, the fact remains that KKE cannot expect to find "broad support" for an anti-government campaign based on hypocrisy; a hypocrisy which makes the "orthodox" Greek communists appear to understand the special problems and special conditions

with the necessary tactical maneuvers in the case of everyone else, except for their country. This is a policy which certainly does injustice to the question of Resistance, the generation of communists who shed their blood for this country, who sometimes wasted their blood because of the mistakes of their leaders, when these leaders ignored the developments, the conditions, the balance of power, and the possibilities for international support. These leaders were drawn to a second guerrilla campaign which doomed them from the beginning. PASOK had no right to commit similar mistakes.

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## PASOK COMMUNIQUE REPORTEDLY LACKS PUBLIC APPEAL

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 7 Aug 83 p 4

/Article by Giorgos Massavetas/

/Excerpts/ As I was reading the decision of the PASOK Central Committee my mind automatically recalled something said with disarming simplicity a few years ago by Dolores Ibaruri, or Passionaria, the known leader of the Spanish Communist Movement when she was asked how much she had studied the Marxist texts: "All those writings of the socialists put me to sleep." Yet Passionaria always stood at the forefront of the struggle for Social Change.

Unfortunately, the cadres of the parties of the Left, whether of the orthodox or renewal communist parties or of the socialist Left, have developed a tendency to use "difficult" words, foreign terms, formalistic--and therefore dead--expressions which you would think they reproduce themselves.

This New Socialist Left, which is still in its infancy, makes an incomprehensible effort to make its texts appear old, shrunken, without life, and without the vigor of the movement they are supposed to express.

Let Us Talk Simply

A political text has a simple objective: to reach the people. This means it must be such in length and content to achieve its purpose; namely, that it be read--and understood--by as many people as possible. Well, the resolution of the 10th session of the Central Committee--and not only that--does not have this quality. It is a long, boring text, often with a twisted phraseology, with ponderous newly coined terms which make up another political purist language dressed up with the grammar of the vernacular.

First of all, it has the fault of talking about "everything under the sun." You think there is some dogmatic obligation to talk every time about everything. It may be that between sessions so much time passes that indeed much has changed and much has happened. By necessity the agenda expands and so do the resolutions that follow. But then the resolutions seem to be addressed to some "specialists", not to the people. To cadres and to...opponents who are obligated to read them.

But when a political decision is not "absorbed" by the people, when it does not cause their positive or negative reactions, then it has failed. A political text which has to be "simplified" and "translated" so that it can be understood by the masses is like a joke that has to be explained so the audience will know when to laugh!

The resolution contains many useful things. But how many will have the courage to read it after they come home from work at the factory, the farms, the offices, the stores? And how many will not be put to sleep like Passionaria with the writings of the intellectuals of "paleolithic" communism?

I wish I were the only one who fell asleep reading the resolution of the 10th Session. The worst part is that there are cadres who are trying to use this kind of complex language in their daily speeches. They represent those "komsomols" for whom Kalinin said when he heard them speak that they must not be in a syndicalist youth meeting since they do not speak simply as when they talk with each other.

The socialist movement does not need a political theology to succeed. We need to learn to talk "straight and simple." To understand each other...The declaration of the Third of September and the immediacy of Andreas is a useful guide for everyone, at least for those who do not feel the need to become a socialist "etite".

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## REPORTED PASOK MEASURES TO WIN NEXT ELECTIONS

Athens | VRADYNI in Greek 8 Aug 83 p 7

/Text/ According to exclusive reports a special plan is being studied in secrecy by top PASOK personalities to enable it to emerge victorious in the next election.

Reliable sources report that the 10th Session of the PASOK Central Committee last weekend is one part of the plan being put together for the PASOK electoral victory in the next parliamentary elections which are expected to take place in June or July 1984, together with the elections for the European parliament.

The points of the plan that we were able to learn about are:

- The electoral system
- The political goals
- The party mobilization
- The taking of popular measures
- The training of cadres who will staff the election machinery

## Two Rounds

With regard to the electoral system it appears that PASOK is thinking in terms of having two rounds somewhat as it is done in France. For this reason, PASOK specialists are studying the French electoral system. In the event the two-round approach is selected, the election for the Euro-deputies will take place on the second Sunday.

On the first Sunday the Electoral Law will provide for the election of 150 deputies with the system of simple proportional, out of 300 deputies. The application of the system of simple proportional will allow PASOK to claim before the people that it has applied the promise it gave in 1981. That the implementation of the 1981 promise will cover only half of the seats will be justified as a transitional stage in the sense that the second Sunday elections will be conducted with the simple proportional.

PASOK will also claim that its loyalty to the simple proportional is strong since it is contemplated to hold the election for the European Parliament

with the proportional and not with the majority system, which is expected to be the system for the second round of the parliamentary election. The plan, therefore, provides for a majority system for the parliamentary election for the second Sunday. During the second round only the two parties, with the largest percentages during the first round, will participate and split between them the remaining 150 seats.

### The Political Goals

According to this electoral plan, PASOK expects to trap the voters of the Center during the first Sunday with a well-organized campaign over a period of months. But on the second Sunday, PASOK's attention will be shifted to the Left to win the votes of all "democratic forces," meaning the voters of alliance PASOK will form with the two KKE's and the smaller groups of the Left and center Left.

This is the reason why, in spite of the strong disagreements between PASOK and KKE-Ext. in particular on issues such as the bases, Article 4, the supervisory councils, etc., the bridge which unites them has not broken down.

### The Mobilization

Another part of the plan deals with the party mobilization. This will be organized through the processes which will be announced for the organization and implementation of PASOK's First Congress. It is expected that these processes will mobilize not only the entire mechanism of the party from the Athens organization to that of the smallest village and from the chairman of PASOK to the last member, but it will also raise the party fever. These are the two elements necessary for the electoral mobilization.

The mobilization of the electoral machinery started in essence with the 10th Session of the Central Committee, since this Committee will prepare the procedures of the Congress and will, through two or three significant points-- one of which will be the Congress and the other the beginning of the electoral campaign.

An important element of the PASOK electoral plan is the taking of certain measures which will please the lower-income groups. For this reason certain provisions are being planned for the new budget to be introduced around the end of 1983.

### A Corps of Praetorians

In any event, special significance is attached to the organization of PASOK's electoral mechanism. According to reliable reports a list has been drawn up with the names of 2,000 lawyers throughout the country. They will become PASOK's strong arm on election day. The selection of the 2,000 lawyers was done secretly in cooperation with the chairman of the NOME organizations and the chiefs of the regions of the movement which have their seat in Athens.

These regional chiefs went to the capitals of the nomes and contacted the selected lawyers who will come to Athens in groups to go through special seminars. Of course, PASOK will try to place these lawyers as chairmen of election-supervising committees in areas where PASOK is weak. This will be a "corps of praetorians" in whom PASOK will trust in large measure its fate in the election according to an informed political observer.

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## GOVERNMENT CENSURED ON LANDING OF LIBYAN AIRCRAFT

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 6 Aug 83 p 2

/Text/ This story of the two Libyan Soviet-made transport planes, which landed at Ellinikon airport en route from Kiev, is an unprecedented case of self-abdication of our sovereign rights.

The Soviet pilots of the two aircraft refused to declare their cargo, saying that they have "nothing to declare to the Greek authorities" who accepted this refusal and did not check the cargo as they had the right to do under international regulations.

The verification of the cargo was necessary for a number of reasons: First, to find out if the aircraft carried ammunition in which case they could not be allowed to land at a civilian airport. Second, to verify if the ammunition was of Soviet origin and whether Libya or another country was the destination. Third, to find out if the cargo included supplies and spare parts of a military nature. And fourth, and most important, to make clear that it is not so easy for a foreign plane to land on Greek soil and to think that by saying "nothing to declare" would set everything right.

Beyond that, the control of the cargo in the two aircraft is necessary for another reason. Libya is accused of instigating the revolutionary activities in Chad, supporting it with war materiel, a fact which has caused international reactions, of which the French are not the least important. On the contrary, socialist France has decided to send aid to the legitimate government in Chad to help it fight the revolutionaries.

We do not care about the domestic affairs of Chad but wonder: why should Greece become a stopover point in an airlift for war materiel to Chad, even through Libya?

What logic dictates our involvement in this affair and what expediency requires that we get entangled in it?

Of course, we may be told that our friendship with Qadhafi requires that "we close our eyes" now and then. But if this is the case, then this is a policy of self-blinding, which directly harms the Greek interests.

There is also the explanation that the two planes landed at the Ellinikon airport to wait until the situation in the Gulf of Sidra had cleared. But this should have made the Greek authorities even more careful in order not to give the impression that we intervene even out of stupidity in someone else's business.

But in all this there is another, more persuasive explanation: Our socialist government wanted to give one more proof of its Third World orientation. And in the name of this orientation it abandoned willingly our sovereign rights to...reaffirm that we have "a proud, independent, multi-dimensional foreign policy," which in fact is nothing else than submission to foreign interests, and to Qadhafi's submission, moreover.

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## COMMENTS ON POSSIBLE CHANGES IN ELECTORAL LAW

Athens ANDI in Greek No 238, 5 Aug 83 pp 4-5

/Excerpts/ The insistence on the view that PASOK "must be the only alternative" inevitably raises the question of the electoral law. And since the "only solution" at times leads to stagnation and impasse, the question is: What will be the electoral law for the next election?

The fact remains that in the 10th Session of the PASOK Central Committee there was no mention of elections, except about those for the European Parliament, which will take place in June 1984. It is also said that Premier Papandreou set a deadline for PASOK's Congress in the first 10 days of February 1984, so that all party members should use all their energy for the "battle of the Euroelections."

On the other hand, most leading cadres of the New Democracy (among them its parliamentary spokesman K. Mitsotakis) believe that PASOK will be forced by circumstances to hold the parliamentary election together with the Euro-election. First, because--as they claim--PASOK in the last election had received 40 percent for the Euro deputies. "Therefore, if 40 percent becomes 35 or even 37 percent then"--according to the reasoning of the New Democracy--"it will be proper for the opposition to ask for an immediate parliamentary election arguing that the PASOK government is a minority government."

Second, because PASOK cannot ignore the fact that the term of office of the president of the republic expires in May 1985 and of course PASOK would not want to have the election of the president only 4 months before the parliamentary elections in October, if the government intends to complete its 4-year term.

Of course, there are opposing views to this reasoning. Government spokesman Dim. Mazoudas continuously insists that the government will exhaust its 4-year term.

PASOK will definitely serve a second 4-year term according to Deputy Minister and Executive Bureau member K. Laliotis, speaking at the Central Committee session. With regard to a decline of PASOK electoral support in the June Euro-elections, the leading PASOK members made the following cold calculations: Suppose--they say privately--the 40 percent becomes 39 or 38, that will not be

fatal. In the parliamentary election when the voters will face the dilemma PASOK or the Right will face, they will naturally vote for PASOK since in the meantime any dissatisfied person will have "relieved themselves" by casting a negative vote in the Euro-elections.

Any discussion about the elections, however, does not change the fact that the government has not yet introduced the new electoral law which will espouse the "simple proportional," but not the pure simple proportional. Neither does it change the fact that for the government the major objective is to preserve the "political, electoral majority of PASOK," a fact which predetermines the content of the electoral law--whenever it is introduced.

But the preservation of the political, electoral majority--according to PASOK apologists--is something natural and legitimate for any party in power. On the other hand--they add--through the policy of "national popular unity" PASOK extends a hand of cooperation to all forces that want to support the Change.

The session of the PASOK Central Committee did not possibly add new elements, but it gave to the PASOK cadres an opportunity to ponder and grasp whether the policy of the "only solution" contributes to the "triumph of Change" or not. Beyond that the thinking is free.

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## PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON GOVERNMENT POLICIES, PERSONALITIES

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek No 782, 28 Jul 83 pp 4, 7

[Excerpt] With this issue EPIKAIRA starts the publication of the fascinating and impressive results of an (in-depth) public opinion poll which ended the first 10 days of July 1983 in the area of the former capital administration (Athens and Piraeus-First and Second election districts). The polling was done on behalf of EPIKAIRA by the known Neilsen firm in a sample of 860 persons representing all shades of the area's population. All interviews were made in the homes of the interviewees. The polling was carried out by 23 specialists and 3 supervisors.

Before giving the results of the survey we consider it appropriate to publish all the questions asked and we request our readers to read them in order to better understand the answers and the corresponding problems.

## The Questions

1. To what degree are you satisfied with the way the government dealt with:

- a. Foreign policy.
- b. The NATO question.
- c. The EEC issue.
- d. The Turkey/Cyprus issue.
- e. The bases issue (the poll was taken before the agreement).
- f. The economic policy.
- g. The income policy.
- h. Inflation.
- i. Unemployment.
- j. Education.
- k. Transportation.
- l. The cloud ["nefos"--smog over Athens].

2. Whom do you consider as the most successful cabinet members?

3. Who are the most unsuccessful cabinet members?

4. What is your opinion of the government cadres?
  - a. Do you find them able and experienced?
  - b. Are they the right persons for the positions they hold?
  - c. Are they honest?
5. What is your opinion about the problems our economy faces today? Are they fewer than in past years, greater or the same?
6. Do you believe that the policy the government follows:
  - a. Encourages private initiative?
  - b. Has helped the small-medium-sized enterprises?
  - c. Is preparing the abolition of private initiative?
7. Will the extension of socialization [nationalization] to the private sector improve the national economy situation?
8. Is the increase in unemployment a result of the government's economic policy?
9. Has the income's purchasing value decreased compared to that of the previous year?
10. Do you believe that after joining the EEC, our country has until now derived benefits or has it suffered losses?
11. Do you believe that with the foreign policy it follows, the government moves our country away from the western world?
12. Has the government's pro-Arab policy until now given our country:
  - a. National advantages?
  - b. Economic advantages?
13. What is your opinion about the government's policy compared to its pre-election declarations? Do you believe that it keeps the promises it gave concerning:
  - a. Foreign policy?
  - b. Economic policy?
  - c. Social policy?
14. Do you believe that in relation to its geographic position and its size our country:
  - a. Can survive nationally
  - b. Can survive economicallyif it is not allied with one of the two superpowers?

15. Do you believe that our country should belong to one big alliance (such as, for example, NATO or the Warsaw Pact?).

16. If we agree that our country must join an alliance, which one, in your opinion, would better serve our national and economic interests--NATO or the Warsaw Pact?

17. What is your opinion about the major opposition party? Are you satisfied with:

- a. The way it exercises opposition?
- b. The persons running it?
- c. The dynamism it shows?

18. Do you believe that the opposition's charges about:

- a. The existence of the greenguards
- b. A single-party state

are sound?

19. What is your opinion about the state media (radio and TV)?

- a. Do they inform public opinion objectively?
- b. Do they influence public opinion in favor of democratic principles?
- c. Do they influence public opinion in favor of the communist ideology?

#### Conclusions

Ordinarily, the results of the polls published in newspapers and magazines include a preface with the most impressive points in order to attract the reader's interest. We shall not follow this routine for two reasons: First, because our study is extensive and the correct evaluation and the truer appreciation and comparison of the answers would be jeopardized. Second, because we believe that the political poll taking should be read soberly and calmly without the bias of our political or ideological position.

Surely, our comments on the data the poll provided will be in accordance with our own ideological beliefs and political hopes. But the very same data of the survey shall be reported exactly as they were given to us in the form of tables.

For this reason--for a sober perusal of the results--the information concerning the strength of the parties will be published in the last installment when our own comments and conclusions will also be given. It is worth noting, however, at this time that an exceptionally large percentage of those polled, 37 percent, refused to reveal their party affiliation or stated that they do not belong to any party. This fact is of particular significance since it is observed for the first time in political pollings, given that the question did not concern the party they supported in previous elections or will support in the future. In the columns with analyses this category is denoted by the

initials KhKD (Without Party Affiliation), while the column with the initials MK (Small Parties) includes KKE-Int., the Democratic Socialism Party [KODISO] and the National Array [EP].

To What Degree Are You Satisfied  
With the Government's Policy?

The greatest public discontent is on matters concerning domestic policy and mainly in the sectors of economic policy, quality of life and environment. The way the government dealt with the "nefos," unemployment and inflation satisfies only 11 percent of the total of those asked while respectively 79 and 77 percent were slightly or not at all satisfied [Table I].

TABLE I  
DEGREE OF SATISFACTION IN  
VARIOUS GOVERNMENT POLICY SECTORS

Total Number of Persons Asked Horizontally = 100%	Much %	Little or None %	No Answer %
The "Nefos" Question	11	79	9
Unemployment	11	79	10
Inflation	11	77	12
Income Policy	13	71	16
Economic Policy	16	74	10
The NATO Issue	17	57	26
Transportation *	19	69	12
The Bases Issue *	20	59	21
Education	23	60	17
The EEC Issue	25	55	20
Foreign Policy	26	54	20
The Turkey/Cyprus Issue	34	47	19

\* The poll was taken before the agreement for the bases was announced.

Of those who said that they were PASOK followers only 23 percent were pleased with the measures against the "nefos," 24 percent for the measures against unemployment and 24 percent for the measures against inflation.

Also, 3 percent, 5 percent and 2 percent of the ND, KKE and MK followers respectively expressed satisfaction while 18 percent of those who did not state party preference also expressed satisfaction.

One can see, however, that the great majority is "not at all" or "little" pleased in the other sectors of government activity. Only in the handling of issues related to Turkey and Cyprus does one find the greatest approval--34 percent of those asked declared that they are satisfied. By party followers



this approval corresponds to 52 percent of PASOK followers, 19 percent of ND, 23 percent of KKE, 36 percent of MK followers and 26 percent of those with no party preference.

On the question of NATO, 17 percent said they were much satisfied and 57 percent little or not at all while 26 percent failed to answer. Those satisfied represented ND, KKE and MK followers, respectively, while 11 percent did not state party preference.

As in the case of NATO, so also on the issues of the EEC, the bases and foreign policy the reasons for dissatisfaction are not always the same and in many cases are diametrically opposite. Worth noting, however, is the great dissatisfaction about the handling of these issues by the government and the share of this dissatisfaction on the part of the PASOK partisans.

Whom Do You Consider the  
Most Successful Ministers?

Among the first five most successful ministers we find Gennimatas (percentages in parentheses) (33), Koutsogiorgas (29), Arsenis (29), Kharalambopoulos (27) and Mangakis.

TABLE II

WHOM DO YOU CONSIDER AS MOST SUCCESSFUL MINISTER?

	Total %	Men %	Women %	Party Followers				No Party Mention %
				PASOK %	ND %	KKE %	MK %	
Gennimatas	33	39	27	47	16	25	43	25
Koutsogiorgas	29	33	25	45	6	29	28	20
Arsenis	29	31	26	44	17	16	33	22
Kharalambopoulos	27	30	24	36	26	22	26	22
Mangakis	26	28	24	29	26	25	37	21
Kaklamanis	24	25	23	33	20	22	24	18
Simitis	23	30	17	25	23	21	46	19
Skoularikis	22	25	19	32	23	15	28	15
Avgerinos	20	19	20	21	18	21	38	15
Tsokhatzopoulos	20	25	15	27	16	21	26	13
Tritsis	11	9	12	13	11	10	11	9
Giannopoulos	7	8	5	9	6	4	2	6
Koulourianos	6	7	5	9	3	8	3	4
No Answer	29	23	35	16	30	36	14	39

PASOK followers consider the following as the most successful ministers. Koutsogiorgas (45 percent), Arsenis (44), Kharalambopoulos (38) and Kaklamanis (33). Only 16 percent did not answer the above question, while 60 percent of PASOK followers did not answer the question whom they consider as most unsuccessful ministers.

The ND followers gave the following preferences: Kharalambopoulos (26), Mangakis (26), Simitis (23), Skoularikis (23) and Kaklamanis (22).

The MK followers' opinion was as follows: Simitis (46), Gennimatas (43), Avgerinos (38), Mangakis (39) and Arsenis (33).

Those who did not state party affiliation: Gennimatas (25), Arsenis (22), Kharalambopoulos (22), Mangakis (21) and Koutsogiorgas (20).

Of those asked, 29 percent did not answer.

Whom Do You Consider the  
Most Unsuccessful Ministers?

Among the first five most unsuccessful cabinet members we find (percentages in parentheses):

Tritsis (20), Giannopoulos (18), Koutsogiorgas (15), Arsenis (14) and Avgerinos (12).

TABLE III

WHOM DO YOU CONSIDER AS MOST UNSUCCESSFUL MINISTER?

	Total %	Men %	Women %	Party Followers				No Party Mention %
				PASOK %	ND %	KKE %	MK %	
Tritsis	20	27	13	19	28	19	30	18
Giannopoulos	18	24	12	12	28	29	30	14
Koutsogiorgas	15	20	11	8	40	14	24	14
Arsenis	14	17	12	5	29	26	31	11
Avgerino	12	15	9	11	17	13	14	10
Koulourianos	11	13	9	7	19	12	24	10
Kaklamanos	10	13	8	7	10	10	17	12
Kharalambopoulos	10	11	8	7	16	10	20	8
Simitis	7	9	5	7	11	10	3	6
Gennimatas	6	10	3	5	11	12	11	3
Skoularikis	6	7	5	3	7	6	10	8
Tzokhatzopoulos	6	9	3	4	9	3	10	7
Mangakis	5	5	4	4	3	6	7	5
No Answer	56	48	63	64	37	51	33	60

The impressive fact as concerns this question is the percentage of those who failed to answer--a total of 56 percent. Those who did not answer represented 64 percent PASOK followers, 51 percent KKE followers and 60 percent mentioned no party affiliation.

The PASOK followers consider Tritsis (19), Giannopoulos (12) and Avgerinos (11) as the most unsuccessful ministers while the ND followers consider Koutsogiorgas (40), Arsenis (29), Tritsis (28) and Giannopoulos (28).

The KKE followers gave low rates to Giannopoulos (29), Arsenis (26) and Tritsis (19), while those of the small parties consider Arsenis (31), Tritsis (30) and Giannopoulos (30) as the worst ministers. Those who did not mention party affiliation consider Tritsis (18), Giannopoulos (14), Koutsogiorgas (14) and Arsenis as the worst ministers.

#### What Is Your Opinion About the Government Cadres

The great majority of those polled, 61 percent, believe that the government cadres are honest. Only 10 percent doubt this quality while 29 percent failed to respond.

Of those polled, 44 percent claim that these cadres are capable and experienced, 29 percent disagree with such a view and 27 percent did not answer.

Most of those supporting the view that they are capable and experienced are PASOK followers (75 percent). On the contrary, 56 percent of the ND followers disagree. The KKE followers and those who did mention party affiliation are almost equally divided on the above view.

Finally, of those asked, 44 percent believe that the persons are fit for the positions they hold while 26 percent disagree and 30 percent chose not to answer. In this case also the PASOK followers (71 percent) support this view while the majority of the other parties consider the government cadres unfit for the positions they hold.

TABLE IV

#### WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT CADRES?

	Total %	Men %	Women %	Party Followers				No Party Mention %
				PASOK %	ND %	KKE %	MK %	
Do You Consider Them Able and Experienced?								
Yes	44	44	44	75	13	39	35	28
No	29	30	28	11	56	38	52	31
No Answer	27	25	28	14	31	23	13	40
Fit for the Positions They Hold?								
Yes	44	44	43	71	17	34	36	31
No	26	28	24	11	54	36	42	26
No Answer	30	27	33	18	29	30	21	43
Are They Honest?								
Yes	61	66	56	86	43	57	60	46
No	10	10	11	3	26	13	13	12
No Answer	29	24	33	12	31	30	27	42

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CSO: 3521/405

## POLL RESULTS ON PASOK ECONOMIC POLICY, FOREIGN ALLIANCES

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek No 783, 4 Aug 83 pp 4-9

/Text/ In this issue we continue the results of the public opinion poll the Nielsen firm conducted on behalf of EPIKAIRA in the Capital Administration area (Athens and Piraeus--First and Second Election Districts).

The data published in the previous issue /No 782, 28 July/ showed that the public expressed great discontent in matters concerning domestic policy, quality of life and the environment. Among those asked, 77-79 percent declared they were little or not at all satisfied with the way the government dealt with unemployment, inflation and the "nefos" /smog over Athens/, while 71-74 percent were displeased with the government's economic and income policy. Also, 69 percent were dissatisfied with the government policy on transportation, 60 percent on the education issue, 57 percent on NATO, 55 percent on EEC, 54 percent and 47 percent on the issues of foreign policy and Turkey-Cyprus, respectively.

Worth noting is the fact that in the first part of the poll a large percentage of PASOK followers share the aforementioned discontent.

The second part of the public opinion poll follows:

What is Your Opinion About PASOK's Political Consistency?

The majority of the people doubts PASOK's political consistency in relation to its pre-election promises with regard to foreign and economic policies. Of those polled, 49 percent deny PASOK's effectiveness in the economic sector and 46 percent in the foreign policy area, while 16 percent declined to answer.

Only in the area of social policy did the people (50 percent) believe PASOK is consistent with its pre-election promises.

TABLE 1

What is Your Opinion About  
PASOK's Political Consistency?

	Total %	Men %	Women %	Party Affiliation				No Party Mentioned %
				PASOK %	ND %	KKE %	MK %	
In Foreign Policy:								
Yes	38	42	34	66	13	21	34	27
No	46	47	44	22	80	73	62	45
No Answer	16	11	22	12	7	6	4	28
In Economic Policy:								
Yes	35	37	33	62	13	18	27	25
No	49	50	47	26	80	77	67	47
No Answer	16	13	20	12	7	5	6	28
In Social Policy:								
Yes	50	54	47	78	27	35	53	37
No	33	34	33	11	58	57	44	36
No Answer	17	13	20	11	16	8	3	27

PASOK's followers believe their party's policy is 66 percent consistent in the field of foreign policy, 62 percent in the economic policy and 78 percent in the social policy.

The majority of the ND and KKE followers, as well as those who did not mention party affiliation, believes PASOK is inconsistent regarding its pre-election promises.

It is evident that the PASOK followers are in great disagreement with the rest of the electoral body. This means that a large percentage of the PASOK followers continues to give credit to the party's leadership. Of course, this percentage is smaller than it appears since it concerns only those who declared they belong to PASOK and not those who have already shifted to other parties or are not affiliated with any party.

This disagreement, however, also appears in the social policy sector, the only difference being that in this case a relatively large percentage of followers of other parties--compared to the previously mentioned sectors--are willing to accept that PASOK is trying to appear consistent.

TABLE II

## Is Private Initiative Encouraged?

	Total %	Men %	Women %	Party Affiliation				No Party Mentioned %
				PASOK %	ND %	KKE %	MK %	
Yes	43	47	39	61	14	45	38	36
No	36	39	32	20	65	41	55	36
No Answer	21	13	29	19	21	14	8	28

The picture public opinion has painted about the government's economic policy and its impact on private initiative is confusing. To a large degree this shows how uninformed the people are. But it also reveals the opposition's weakness to persuade both public opinion and its own followers about the intentions of PASOK's economic policy.

TABLE III

Does PASOK Pave the Way for  
Eliminating Private Initiative?

	Total %	Men %	Women %	Party Affiliation				No Party Mentioned %
				PASOK %	ND %	KKE %	MK %	
Yes	25	28	23	26	50	23	25	19
No	40	46	33	45	13	52	44	37
No Answer	35	26	44	29	37	25	31	44

About 43 percent said that PASOK encourages private initiative while 36 percent do not think so. The first view is supported by 61 percent of PASOK supporters. The second by 45 percent of the KKE followers. What is amazing is that 35 percent of the ND followers either do not answer or believe that PASOK encourages private initiative.

It is worth noting that to the question of PASOK paving the way for eliminating private initiative only 50 percent of the ND followers are sure of it while the other 50 percent do not respond (37 percent) or do not believe so (13 percent).

Forty percent of the total asked rejected this view while 25 percent accepted it, were sure of it, that is, while 35 percent declined to answer. Of course, the large percentage of those who did not answer shows that a large percentage of the people are either uninformed or have so many reservations they

are unable to decide.

The next tangible question is whether the PASOK policy benefited the small-medium enterprises.

TABLE IV

Did the Small-Medium Enterprises Benefit?

	Total %	Men %	Women %	Party Affiliation				No Party Mentioned %
				PASOK %	ND %	KKE %	MK %	
Yes	30	29	31	49	14	18	29	22
No	45	51	38	26	59	70	61	45
No Answer	25	20	30	24	27	12	10	33

Of those polled, 45 percent did not hesitate to say that PASOK harmed such enterprises, while 30 percent felt it did benefit them; 25 percent did not express a view--a percentage which is much smaller than that of the previous question. One can, therefore, assume that as of this moment a large part of the population tends to believe PASOK is against private initiative but as yet is not fully convinced of it.

TABLE V

Will Extension of Socialization to the Private Sector Improve the National Economy?

	Total %	Men %	Women %	Party Affiliation				No Party Mentioned %
				PASOK %	ND %	KKE %	MK %	
Yes	44	47	41	66	20	44	40	31
No	24	30	19	7	49	36	42	26
No Answer	32	23	40	27	31	20	18	43

A total of 44 percent believe extension of socialization to the private sector will improve the national economy situation while 24 percent disagree and 32 percent have no opinion.

To better understand this issue, it is necessary to remember that the term "private initiative" is to a large degree politicized and that for the PASOK and KKE followers it is, to a considerable percentage, negatively charged and, as a result, they project their political position when asked about this issue.

On the contrary, the term "small-medium enterprises," even though it falls in the category of private initiative, does not create negative reactions because it is separated from the private initiative which is identified mainly with "large enterprises" or "large capital."

Generally, it is certain that if the answers to this group of questions are studied in a comparative way, serious conclusions will be derived not only about the level of imparting information but also about the tendencies prevailing at this moment among the people.

TABLE VI

Has the Government's Pro-Arab  
Policy Benefited Us Until Now?

	Total	Men	Women	Party Affiliation				No Party Mentioned
	%	%	%	PASOK	ND	KKE	MK	
				%	%	%	%	%
National Advantages:								
Yes	37	41	33	55	16	37	36	28
No	32	40	24	22	57	28	46	32
No Answer	31	19	42	23	27	35	18	40
Economic Advantages:								
Yes	36	43	31	56	19	36	39	24
No	30	38	23	20	51	28	44	32
No Answer	33	19	47	24	30	36	17	44

Public opinion cannot assess as yet the goals of the government's policy toward the Arab states.

To the question if this policy provides national advantages, 37 percent said "yes", 32 percent answered "no" and 31 percent declined to answer. (In other words 63 percent either feel we do not derive national advantages or declined to give an answer.) We have, that is, three equivalent groups with different positions on the same subject.

The same situation arose when the question was asked if this policy brings economic advantages: 36 percent said "yes", 30 percent disagreed and 33 percent did not respond. (In other words, 63 percent either think we have no economic advantages or do not answer.)

The majority of the PASOK followers, 55-56 percent, see advantages in both cases, while 20 percent disagree with such a position and the rest do not choose to answer.



TABLE VII

Do You Believe That Since Joining EEC  
Our Country Has Derived Benefits  
Or Was It Harmed?

	Party Affiliation							No Party Mentioned
	Total %	Men %	Women %	PASOK %	ND %	KKE %	MK %	
Has Benefited	30	37	23	25	65	6	46	29
Was Harmed	30	31	30	27	12	71	27	25
Neither	19	16	21	27	8	14	12	18
No Answer	21	16	26	21	15	9	15	28

Of those polled, 30 percent believe Greece has derived benefits, 30 percent think it was harmed, while 19 percent hold that there is neither profit nor loss and 21 percent declined to express their views.

Among PASOK's followers the corresponding percentages are 25, 27, 27 and 21, while among the ND followers 65 percent believe Greece profited, 12 percent that it sustained losses, 8 percent said Greece did not derive any profit nor did it sustain any loss, while 15 percent did not respond.

Only 6 percent of the KKE followers and 46 percent of the Small Parties followers believe that joining EEC was beneficial while 71 percent and 27 percent, respectively, feel otherwise. Also, 14 and 12 percent of KKE and MK followers, respectively, said there were no advantages nor disadvantages while 9 percent and 28 percent, respectively, failed to express an opinion. Of those who did not mention party affiliation, 29 percent said Greece benefited, 25 percent held that the country was harmed, 18 percent said it made no difference, while 28 percent declined to give an answer.

It is clear that only the ND and MK followers have in their large majority formed an opinion (positive) as well as those of KKE (negative). A great percentage of PASOK followers and those who did not mention party affiliation seem to be indecisive.

#### Greece and International Alliances

The issue of our country's survival with or without participation in a big political-military configuration causes strong public opinion clashes, which, percentage-wise, shape up into two groups--one which holds that participation in one of the two alliances is indispensable, while the other does not believe so.

TABLE VIII

Can We Survive As a Nation If We  
Do Not Belong To Any Alliance?

	Total %	Men %	Women %	Party Affiliation				No Party Mentioned %
				PASOK %	ND %	KKE %	MK %	
Yes	43	45	41	50	17	67	44	35
No	47	48	45	39	72	26	49	53
No Answer	10	7	14	11	11	7	7	12

Of those polled, 47 percent believe we cannot survive as a nation if we do not belong to an alliance, while 43 percent believe it is possible to survive and 10 percent express no opinion.

TABLE IX

Can We Survive Economically If  
We Do Not Belong To Any Alliance?

	Total %	Men %	Women %	Party Affiliation				No Party Mentioned %
				PASOK %	ND %	KKE %	MK %	
Yes	42	46	39	50	14	69	43	33
No	46	47	46	38	76	26	52	51
No Answer	12	7	15	11	10	5	5	16

Forty six percent believe we cannot survive economically if we do not belong to any of the alliances, while 42 percent disagree and 12 percent did not answer.

TABLE X

Must We Belong To An Alliance?

	Total %	Men %	Women %	Party Affiliation				No Party Mentioned %
				PASOK %	ND %	KKE %	MK %	
Yes	46	46	46	34	83	25	44	54
No	43	47	40	57	8	69	48	32
No Answer	11	7	14	9	9	6	8	14

Again, 46 percent believe our country must belong to one of the big alliances while 43 percent disagree and 11 percent declined to answer.

These responses not only express a party position but reflect as well an ideological clash, both within the total electorate and within each party separately.

TABLE XI

If We Must Belong To An Alliance, Which One Will  
Better Serve Our National And Economic Interests?

	Party Affiliation							No Party Mentioned
	Total %	Men %	Women %	PASOK %	ND %	KKE %	MK %	
NATO	27	32	21	17	77	3	30	29
Warsaw Pact	15	13	17	18	1	46	10	6
No Alliance	33	38	27	39	7	38	46	29
No Answer	26	17	35	26	15	12	14	36

Particularly problematic is the contrast in the PASOK electoral potential. Among its followers 17 percent want us to belong to NATO and 18 percent prefer the Warsaw Pact. Worth nothing also is the fact that only 46 percent of the KKE followers want Greece's association with the Warsaw Pact.

Provided that the country must belong to some alliance, 27 percent of those polled said the alliance must be NATO, while 15 percent expressed preference for the Warsaw Pact, 33 percent do not want the country to belong to any alliance, and 26 percent declined to answer.

Finally, 39 percent of PASOK and 38 percent of KKE followers, as well as 29 percent of those who did not state party affiliation, do not want the country to join any alliance. This position on the part of a large percentage of the PASOK and KKE electoral potential reveals a strong trend for neutrality or cautiousness toward the existing big alliances.

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CS0: 3521/411

## POLITICAL FUTURE OF PSD, MOTA PINTO APPRAISED

## PSD--No Political Direction

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 23 Jul 83 pp 16R-17R

[Excerpts] In the early days of June, when the PS [Socialist Party] and the PSD [Social Democratic Party] signed the political agreement in Lisbon supporting the current government, no one had any doubt about the reasons why Mario Soares signed the pertinent protocol. The PS embarked upon the coalition with a clear strategy, personified in a man who is and will continue to be the unchallenged leader of the party.

However the other party to the contract, with Mota Pinto as its protagonist, brought a monumental ambiguity to the coalition. It did not have a rallying strategy unless it is that of the "national interest," much less clear and definite political leadership capable of representing the will of the PSD with a minimum of stability.

## No Political Direction

Today, when a bare 2 months of existence have elapsed for the coalition, no one is reluctant to say that the PSD lacks political leadership.

"There is no clear strategy, just as there is no leader," EXPRESSO was informed by a high-ranking social democratic leader, who is moreover deeply involved in the coalition. He admits unhesitatingly that "the political leadership by Mota Pinto has weakened, rather than asserted itself."

Why?

In the government, and despite the optimal relations which exist and are carefully encouraged by Mario Soares, Mota Pinto ranks second to a prime minister whose personality and leadership capacity the social democratic ministers are the first to recognize, even voicing some surprise.

In the party, with the effort to maintain an "equidistant position" with regard to what he describes as the "factions existing prior to Montechora," Mota Pinto is failing to satisfy anyone, allowing himself the luxury of losing battles as important as that of the PSD parliamentary group, to which he did not even succeed in giving a direction.

After having paid the high price of losing the control he had over the labor wing of the party, Nascimento Rodrigues departed from the triumvirate which emerged from Montechoro. Eurico de Melo also moved away from the triumvirate, carefully reserving for himself a certain autonomy in order to criticize the current coalition and those in the PSD who embody it.

The "baronies" are tending to be reestablished. The apparatus, for its part, is giving Mota Pinto the "benefit of the doubt," carefully safeguarding his ever increasingly decisive role in the future choice of any new party regime.

#### Proof of Life

The PSD, the geometric location of ideological differences and multiple interests, finds itself faced with the question of its identity at every turn in its political course.

The fracture line between the two great political families, the social democrats and the liberals (more or less radical) passes through its center. Populism (more or less latent) has served to date to unify the complex of interests coming together in the PSD/PPD [Popular Democratic Party], representing, roughly speaking, an expeditious middle bourgeoisie which is on the rise and is more concerned about the efficiency of the means of implementing its power than with the heart of the ideologies which serve it as such.

It is for this reason that for the majority of the PSD leaders, the coming presidential elections may become the "proof of life" of the party.

And it is now from this perspective that, immediately after the holidays, the various "runners" in the congressional elections to be held early in 1984 will line up on the party grid.

#### Right-Wing Project

For the right wing of the PSD, the prospects appear clearer. Without commitment to the PS-PSD coalition, and having among its representatives some of the candidates urging an extended project for reestablishing a large liberal right-wing bloc in Portugal, this faction, of which Marcelo Rubelo de Sousa, Jose Miguel Judice and Pedro Santana Lopes, among others, are representatives, is facing the congress with the relative desire not to have to struggle further for the leadership of the party, and to remain from the outset in a position of profound criticism, either with regard to the strategy which led the PSD to the coalition, or with regard to the first results of the PS-PSD government. The presidential elections may possibly provide the right moment for polarization in support of a right-wing candidate.

In any case, this liberal wing of the PSD planned for the congress well enough in advance, from a public base, strong as it is in the Lisbon district, by means, for example, of the organization of a series of discussions about the major national issues, designed to broaden its sphere of influence among the right-wing intellectuals.

## The Personal Strategy of Mota Pinto

"Attacking Mota Pinto's leadership is the quickest way to put an end to the government coalition," those surrounding the deputy prime minister and minister of national defense say.

The argument has weight, and may win some comprehension within the PSD. It is that used by Mota Pinto, in particular, in response to the continuing attacks of which he has been made the target by the political novices in the public squares of Lisbon.

The argument also reveals a strategy. In the Congress and in the party, Mota Pinto will carry the weight of being the PSD leader in the coalition. However he needs, even there, to establish positions both on the government and the party leadership levels.

For him as well, the future is only too clear: either it will be he who negotiates with Soares the price of support for the candidacy of the socialist leader for the presidency of the republic, or else his total commitment to this government and this coalition will not bring him any political benefit, leaving him only the option, still mentioned, of returning to Coimbra.

Curiously, it is Mota Pinto's "entourage" which is bringing up the possibility of a new military candidacy in 1985--"if the economic and political conditions in the country so dictate." And the truth is that the social democratic leader can always make use of his post as minister of defense to create the necessary bearing points for the future implementation of such a strategy.

## Mota Amaral--The (Still) Unknown Factor

The great unknown which remains within the PSD context continues to be Mota Amaral, although the decisive factor in determining the balance of forces within the party is becoming increasingly the apparatus and its "big boss," Antonio Capucho.

It would be difficult for Mota Amaral to pose any immediate challenge to a political alliance which, after all, he has always defended. And further, one of which he should be one of the protagonists, according to logic (which seems to be lacking in politics).

It was Mota Amaral who allowed the fall of Balsemao and the rise of Mota Pinto in Montechoro. What the leader from the Azores would want from the next Congress--since we know that he is the only party figure who can succeed in rallying and giving a minimum of cohesion to the social democratic sectors ranging from the pro-Balsemao faction to the "44," and including such individuals as Joao Salgueiro, and who are anguished to see others implementing the alliance they have always urged--this is what remains to be seen.

At some time Mota Amaral will have to "test" the continental policy and demonstrate that he knows how to deal with it on a day-to-day basis. But

everything depends on the presidential elections here too. Or rather, everything depends on knowing who in the PSD wants to and can serve as the "interlocutor of Mario Soares" when and if it is a question of negotiating support for his candidacy for the Belem post.

This is a candidacy which is, moreover, in the view of many PSD leaders, not only unbeatable but essential, one which might have as its price the surrender of the prime ministerial post to an "independent" named Ernani Lopes, as some of the more optimistic voices in the party have already suggested.

#### PSD--All Loss, No Gain

Libson EXPRESSO in Portuguese 23 Jul 83 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva]

[Text] To a not entirely inattentive observer, the different ways in which the PS and the PSD have viewed their roles in the cabinet will certainly not have gone unnoticed.

The PS placed its three leading figures in the cabinet, to wit Mario Soares, Almeida Santos and Jaime Gama. The PSD, on the contrary, only installed one of its three vice presidents (Mota Pinto) in the executive branch, leaving the other two (Eurico de Melo and Nascimento Rodrigues) in the party.

This could mean various things.

It might mean, for example, a different kind of fear on the part of the two leaderships with regard to the internal opposition groups.

While the PS leadership, in acting as it has, may have demonstrated confidence in itself, free of fear that its full participation in the government will lead to the rise within the party of the opposition faction (in this case, the former secretariat group), the PSD leadership, by keeping two of its three vice presidents within the party, has demonstrated fear that the scattering of its leaders might lead to a seizure of the reins of internal power by the opposition.

But the way in which the leaderships of the two parties view the formation of the cabinet may have a second interpretation.

It is this: the PS and the PSD attribute to this cabinet and this government solution different levels of importance.

Thus whereas for the PS, the success of this government would be a matter of life or death, for which reason it would be worth running certain risks on the party level, it would have secondary importance for the PSD and thus would not justify excessive sacrifices.

In a word: while the leadership of the PS may have chosen to place the government above the party, the PSD leadership may have chosen to place the party above the government.

It should be said that either of the two hypotheses put forth might be the right one.

The first even tends to be confirmed by the events which have occurred since the ministers took office.

In fact, it is obvious that Soares had good reason to be calm, while Mota Pinto did not. While the PS continues to be stable and tranquil since its two main leaders departed, the PSD, despite the fact that two vice presidents remained with the party, shows clear signs of instability and insecurity (which would certainly have been greater had Eurico de Melo and Nascimento Rodrigues abandoned their posts).

Now let us proceed to the second hypothesis.

It is also true that there were reasons for the PS to feel more responsible for the cabinet than the PSD did, and thus a greater PS commitment to its structure is natural.

Above and beyond that, if the government is successful, the main beneficiary will be the PS and Dr Mario Soares, and if the government fails, they will also be the leading culprits.

Apparently the question is viewed thus.

But let us approach the problem in another way.

What will happen if this government, that is to say the "central bloc," fails?

Could Mota Pinto return calmly to his party as if nothing had happened?

The answer is no.

If the government fails, Mota Pinto and the present social democratic leaders, who were the negotiators of the "central bloc" and those mainly responsible for this government solution, will be blamed for the failure, and it is not difficult to foresee their replacement by those who have always opposed the alliance with the PS.

And if the government is successful?

In such a case, given the subordinate position occupied by the PSD in it, since it did not appoint to the executive branch a team even capable of competing with the Soares-Almeida Santos-Gama triumvirate, the laurels for success will go not only mainly, but entirely, to the PS.

To summarize: the present leadership of the PSD, since it does not want to take risks, has placed itself in a poor situation in which it has everything to lose and nothing to gain.



If the "central bloc" fails, it will be sunk.

If the "central bloc" triumphs, it will be charged with having played such a cautious role in it.

And in such a case, it could happen that in the next elections, the social democratic voters would prefer a more "useful" vote in the party headed by Soares to a vote which would after all be "useless" in the PSD.

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CSO: 3542/203

## PCP'S IMPROVED POSITION VIS-A-VIS GOVERNMENT SURVEYED

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 8 Jul 83 pp 15-16

[Text] The PCP is more combative toward the PS [Socialist Party]/PSD [Social Democratic Party] government than in the early days of the AD [Democratic Alliance] administration. Does the latter prefer this? Not exactly: it hardly had more time to get prepared, not surprisingly.

The PCP is now enjoying life. It never encountered, in the period after 25 April, such a favorable opportunity for demonstrating its ability to intervene, the indisputability of its influence in the labor world and its penetration of the lower middle classes which--according to its program--it intends to achieve.

Essentially opposition oriented, as in other countries with a parliamentary democracy--the case of France is something of an exception--the PCP is planning to give a demonstration of what professionalism is in politics and what militancy is in action. In the first instance, it is operating like a computer. In the second, it is struggling with the enormity of the apparatus and the impossibility of militarily controlling all battalions, mainly those in which economic problems and dynamics, on the left and on the right, are complicating its plans.

There it is: The PCP basically likes to work at a leisurely pace, without pressures, taking the time that is needed at the time. Like governments which succeed each other. With the difference that the PCP knows how to secure its serenity: it controls spontaneity and stimulates inertia, when useful. Governments remain bewildered when it comes to creativity and try at all costs to manage an inert society--however much they may deny it. As much as it can, the PCP leads. As much as they can, governments operate as ordered.

## Alternative Opposition

The CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], in a gesture of good will--it has been said that with the victory of Lucas Pires and Adriano Moreira, the centrists have swung to the far right...--has assumed the role of a constructive opposition, when two-thirds of the parliamentary representation would dispense with that.

But not the PCP. It is preconceived opposition, it is declared war--a way of saying, as Alvaro Cunhal does, that it is the government notwithstanding--and it has devised a strategy for producing results in the short and long term. Its plan of action is being introduced on two basic levels: campaigning in the street and legislative bombardment in parliament.

If the CDS is the constructive opposition, and therefore within the system, the PCP intends to establish itself as the alternative opposition with different game rules, but including within the gamut of its planned intervention both a pacifist social base eager for substantive proposals for emerging from the crisis (with real equity of sacrifices) and bolder groups ready to obtain in the street the demands proclaimed. It should not be forgotten that the UDP [Popular Democratic Union] no longer has any seats in parliament, which obliges the PCP to expand the range of its intervention--besides an alternative opposition, it intends to be exclusive opposition--now that what some people considered the system's safety valve, within the system itself, has been destroyed.

#### An Apparatus Moved by Enthusiasm

Anyone observing the PCP's actions in these first days of the Ninth Government would say that he sensed much more aggressiveness than was observable at the time of the inauguration of the AD government.

In geostrategic terms, this could be described as the typical Soviet method of confronting capitalist-bloc realities. The USSR shows a preference for conservative social-democratic type governments, in a Manichean interpretation of a modern Treaty of Tordesillas. Such behavior is observable between Republican and Democratic governments in the United States, between Tories and Labor in Great Britain, between Christian Democrats and Social Democrats in the FRG, not to mention the cold way in which the Soviets disdained Mitterrand's candidacy against Giscard in 1974.

We do not share that view--a reasonable doubt exists. We believe it is more reasonable to conclude that the AD government operated as a surprise to the PCP, with the disadvantage of having another party--and a large party, in terms of the number of votes--in the opposition.

The speeches made at the time of the 1979 interim elections and the propaganda during the campaign for the 1980 parliamentary elections have been confirmed: on both occasions, the aim was to block the right-wing majority. The entire party was mobilized to achieve what proved to be--at the time--an illusion.

The PCP is an apparatus moved by enthusiasm. A pail of cold water does not stall the engine; instead, the machinery slows down. Then it starts to warm up again slowly--and here it is in a flush of activity at the height of the final collapse of the Balsemao government. But initially, no emotional factor stimulated the machinery. At the first sign of such a stimulus, the party's engine began to hum: the slogans posted on walls may be recalled, at the time of Balsemao's first resignation--"Balsemao is gone now, the AD will follow," or something like that.

## The Best Ally

The PCP had the time and means to anticipate everything that would happen in the elections of 25 April--too bad for the PCP if it was unable to predict the obvious...--and it could have reinforced its batteries, prepared the terrain and trained for combat.

The AD, it is said, was its best ally--from the standpoint of the PS: it blocked agreements--through political management councils which followed, with ambitious meekness, the strategy of hardening the administration--galvanized confrontations on legislative matters, hardened repression, promoted contradictions between social groups, created problems in all areas and forced unavoidable solutions of the following government. Whatever the AD did, the PCP took note of it (the 82 draft laws--see the list elsewhere--are proof of this): "You don't want this now? We will attack again. You're doing that now? We'll overturn it later."

It turns out that the PS decided--at least apparently--to take over the legacy of the AD. Obligated to have the PSD with it, the PS did not know how, or was not strong enough, to induce its partner--allegedly renewed--to withdraw from the previous alliance. Under these circumstances, what guilt does the PCP bear for having taken advantage of this? Thus the (present) slogan: "What the AD did is done; what it did not manage to do, the new government will do."

## No Respite

The new government was meanwhile trying its first steps and some collective agreements--also very reasonable--were being concluded, which not even the great effort of those in government, at full steam, could free from social repercussions (e.g., the case of transportation). There was no respite--and the government had to move faster....

Who is responsible? Those who announced that they would launch the campaign at a certain time--or those who were not quick enough in this--urgent--test of speed?

No one is innocent on either side--it merely remains to be seen who will convince public opinion that they were right. Coldly stated, the eagerness of trade union forces, controlled by the PCP, for confrontation (to render service?) seems undeniable: tensions were set to go off like time bombs. But on the other hand, the government is not free of the sin of arrogance, which should be eliminated from the dialogue once and for all.\* Not only because,

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\*Analyzing what the PCP thinks or decides is always an exercise in symptomatology--at least for an outsider. Some slips of more zealous militants or sympathizers may be indicative. For example, we recall having participated in an explanatory meeting, at a newspaper office, in which an attempt was made to demonstrate--as being true--that the journalistic campaign was launched not against the government, but against the failure of employer associations to keep their promises (including management councils of nationalized corporations). The quick, passionate argument of one zealot: "The government is to blame, because it maintains the management councils." The government had taken office 3 or 4 days before....

as the case of transportation itself served to demonstrate, trade union forces are not in a position to wage war for the sake of war, but because this would also be agreeable to the dominant party: they have a precise idea of the time to sound retreat. Did the government have an idea of the exact time for extrication?

On the level of labor, from what may be observed, the campaign will not give the government any time to rest. The exasperation of workers, channeled through the AD and incited by the PCP, is now finding somewhere to explode. In the PCP's case, the attempt to control the action is obvious, in order to obstruct it at the right time or to expand it at the wrong time. Opponents are thus silenced, as happened in the case of Lisnave, by less obvious enthusiasts. First there was an element friendly to the UDP [Popular Democratic Union]--attacked by six in full bath, a fact which went almost unnoticed--and then there were the trade unionists of the UGT [General Union of Workers]--which deserved further attention. Party or trade union members cannot be held responsible, except to the correct extent to which they did not prevent--or did not punish--such excesses. These episodes, however, make it possible to analyze the process of a party leadership--to be in control, even through its establishment by intermediate or basic elements which increased, in the past, anything regardless of the means used.\*

#### The Other Front

If the PCP appears willing to coordinate its cries of protest in the street, its tactics in parliament are quite different. The party's divisions had time to organize the parliamentary group's ammunition, so that it could attack with a fury.

On the very first day, a dozen draft laws were submitted. In the second session, they had already risen to 30. At present, there are 82. We don't know whether any others are on the launching pad--we would be surprised if there weren't....

There is another angle of attack: the strategy is undoubtedly well underway. The PS has to answer to its basic electorate--and not so much to the combined vote--which is, ultimately, its political plan. This Saturday, the PCP chose the most embarrassing issues for its opponent: abortion, police associations, credit agreements, commercial incomes, Vizela, nuclear weapons, back wages, moderating taxes, housing, family, etc.--in all areas, the PCP put a questioner. This commands respect.

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\*In the present journalistic campaign, the PCP's behavior, although different, conforms to the same plan. Pushed aside by trade union leadership, unable to measure the pulse of a suspect class (the trade union withdrew from INTER [expansion unknown], which it founded, in order to stay independent), the PCP tried to use other means: what it did not control would be disarmed and neutralized. This was an error in judgment regarding the time and mood of the class and suddenly, the PCP had put itself outside a process of struggle and ultimately beyond just wage demands.

It is up to the PS (the PSD hardly enters into this game, except to the extent of its solidarity with the government) to take up the fight or lose its footing.

The PCP raised 83 specific issues in less time than the PS implemented its 100 measures. It is not a matter of numbers, it is a matter of time. The PCP required--legitimately--a rapid attack. Its challenge is a competitive one. At least it appears that way. It is using its parliamentary and pacifist victories in the contest.

Will the government be able to respond, point for point? Will it be able to demonstrate a lack of sincerity or seriousness in the proposals submitted? In the case of the wage ceiling, it scored a victory. In the case of news agencies, it lost ground. And the rest?

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CSO: 3542/168

## EANES DENIES ASSENT TO UNITY-WITH-SPAIN ISSUE

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 7 Jul 83 p 6

[Article by Handel de Oliveira]

[Excerpts] In its last issue, the weekly newspaper EXPRESSO published a poll on the possibility of Portugal's political union with Spain, concluding that 26 percent of the 600 persons polled approve of the existence of a single chief of state and a single prime minister for both countries. Five days went by and only three newspapers commented critically on the event, all in editorials published the day before yesterday: the morning papers DIARIO DE NOTICIAS and O DIA and the weekly O DIABO. TEMPO tried to verify the broadest possible view of the Portuguese on this matter. Difficulties of a technical nature do not permit us to give it the attention it deserves in this issue, but our columns will continue to be open to all those who wish to express their opinions on this issue, to which we will return next week. In the meantime, we are publishing today the position of the president of the republic--one of the few people who answered, immediately and without hesitation, the questions we asked, in glaring contrast to the positions taken by the representatives of other organs of sovereignty. Joaquim Letria pointed out to us: "On the very weekend on which these results were revealed, the president of the republic took advantage of a small provincial ceremony to tell the Portuguese that it was necessary 'to have hope.'"

TEMPO asked Joaquim Letria, spokesman for the president of the republic, whether or not the president was concerned over the fact that 26 percent of the Portuguese supported Portugal's political union with Spain.

The President's spokesman replied: "What concerns the president of the republic, and what should concern all the Portuguese, are the reasons behind this fact. That is, what led them to disregard as important both national and cultural identities.

"Basically, what led those Portuguese--who, it must be acknowledged, represent a significant part of the nation--to accept, or to think, that political unity with our only neighbor is the solution to our problems is the worsening of their living conditions, which they believe or know would be much better in Spain, and the desire to be governed by statesmen and policies whose results they observe to be far superior to those achieved thus far in our own country.

"However, I call attention to the fact that on the very weekend that these results were published, the president of the republic took advantage of a small provincial ceremony to tell the Portuguese that 'they must have hope.'"

TEMPO: Who is to say that that statement was motivated by the results of the poll in question?

Joaquim Letria: I prefer not to comment. I repeat only that both things were told to the Portuguese on the same day.

TEMPO: But the president of the republic recently told a Spanish newspaper that an Iberian federation was a possibility to be considered....

Joaquim Letria: I am sorry to have to say this, but that statement attributed to Gen Ramalho Eanes is patently false.

What the president told VANGUARDIA, which is a newspaper more than a century old and whose respectability has been officially recognized by the royal household itself, as well as by Spanish intelligence services, was nothing of the kind. Such false statements are the result of hasty reading or of telegraphed texts which are probably distorted to serve the political aim of, once again, attacking the president of the republic for one thing or another.

I can assure you that what Gen Ramalho Eanes defended was the possibility of Portugal and Spain acting in concert with regard to common goals, as in the case of the EEC, for example, whereby it would be possible to achieve a political influence in keeping with a geographic bloc and a market of almost 50 million people, which will certainly not be the case if each country acts alone. It is obvious that this does not in any way imply that the national independence and sovereignty of each state could have different values. Moreover, the president of the republic also recommended that Portugal and Spain, instead of competing with each other, study ways of taking complementary action in areas in which they have unequal influence, as is the case, respectively, of Africa and Latin America, which the Spanish prefer to call Ibero-America and which I also think is a difference with which we, as a peninsular state, should be pleased.

As for the possibility of an Iberian federation or any other form of association between Portugal and Spain, the president's reply was that this is an hypothesis which belongs only to the future. Nothing else concerning this matter was said to VANGUARDIA.

Portugal and Spain are today two different, specific realities, two states which, only a little more than a decade away from the 21st century, continue to exist on coasts opposite each other, at the very time that they have agreed to demand the right to be accepted by a Europe which was able to explore the Portuguese and Spanish universalist orientation, or if you like, that of all Iberian peoples.

It would be ridiculous for our chief of state, at a time when an effort is being made for such a Europe to become a fact, a political unit, in Lisbon,



a European capital, to reject a hypothesis which the historical process will naturally undertake to disprove or confirm.

Portugal's future belongs only to the Portuguese.

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CSO: 3542/168

## PROPOSED DISMISSAL OF CHIEF OF STAFF CREATES CONTROVERSY

## Firm Decision Alleged

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 28 Jul 83 p 32

[Text] "The government is irreversibly resolute in its decision that Garcia dos Santos, the present army chief of staff, must be replaced in that post." This was confirmed to TEMPO by a source close to Mario Soares and Mota Pinto late yesterday afternoon, just as we were also receiving word that Belem Palace is maintaining "Olympian calm" in response to these developments.

Information reaching our offices later--and which we were unable to submit to this or that government source for comment--advised us that Ramalho Eanes and his "entourage" are willing not to oppose the replacement of Garcia dos Santos if the government in turn agrees to a political "offset," which is said to be specifically the replacement of Lemos Ferreira as air force chief of staff.

That contingent maneuver by Belem is in response, incidentally, to the tactless way in which Mario Soares stated publicly that "political motives" were behind the dismissal of Garcia dos Santos, whereas according to the formal reasons presented by Mota Pinto, deputy prime minister and minister of defense, the dismissal is actually due to the fact that Garcia dos Santos' (flagrant) "lack of profile" makes him unsuitable for the post because of "scandals" in his private life.

That blunder by Mario Soares may cost more than the "sacrifice" of Lemos Ferreira: it may also provoke general hostility from the army, where majority opinion has in fact long been opposed to keeping Garcia dos Santos as CEME [army chief of staff], but only because of the "scandals," not for ambiguous "political motives." That hostility, which we were assured is notorious within the army, was made even worse by the fact that in what was obviously a deliberate move, the CEME's dismissal was proposed on Army Day itself. That timing is generally considered a provocation against the army institution itself rather than against its CEME. (It was confirmed to us that this second "flaw" was the direct responsibility of Mota Pinto.)

Meanwhile, our informants tell us that from the government's viewpoint, five generals are suitable "candidates" to replace Garcia dos Santos. They are Pires Tavares (currently commander of the Center Military Region), Salazar Braga

(currently deputy CEME), Artur Beirao (currently commander of the Lisbon Military Region), Ramires de Oliveira (inspector-general of the army), and Firmino Miguel (head of a department on the Army General Staff).

They explained to us, however, that Ramires de Oliveira and Artur Beirao carry an "Eanist" stamp that makes them controversial in government circles, while Salazar Braga has a connotative image linking him with the extinct AD [Democratic Alliance]. That leaves Pires Tavares and Firmino Miguel as the preferred choices.

Firmino Miguel, recognized as the "most intelligent officer" on the General Staff, loses out to Pires Tavares in the government's eyes because of the latter's alleged superiority as regards the specific problems of the military regions in operational terms. He is said to have the "advantage of being very familiar with all the regiments from the inside."

#### Dismissal Protested

Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 26 Jul 83 p 5

[Text] The government has decided that in addition to the "national crisis," we will also have a "politicomilitary crisis." The government has resolved to present our tired, silent, and apprehensive country with a "summer crisis." It is a reason for talk and intrigue and a pretext for speculation, and it unquestionably presents us with the prospect of real destabilization in the Armed Forces.

Anxious to assert the government's supremacy over the Armed Forces, this government has sown disorder in the serene establishment of conditions for integrating the Armed Forces into the democratic institutional structure by issuing another challenge to the president of the republic. The government has forgotten that a legal situation can be created overnight through constitutional provisions but that existing relationships, ties, and solidarities are not undone, obliterated, or suppressed overnight. The government has also forgotten the special nature of the military movement of national liberation and of the historic act of 25 April 1974. In a single move, it has offended the president of the republic, displeased the "April military," and irritated the "November military." With the rare exception of those nostalgic for the past and the restorationists, whose number is clearly minute, it has performed the miracle of creating unity among people on the outs with each other and those who oppose the CEME, who now agree in their disapproval of an inopportune measure.

And let it not be said--in an undertone--that the righteous man has paid for the sinner: that since it was necessary to make a political response to Gen Nuno Viriato Tavares de Melo Egidio, CEMGFA [Armed Forces chief of staff], the government adopted the expedient of dismissing the CEME, Gen Amadeu Garcia dos Santos. Neither is it to be believed that the government felt pressured by the recent statements by General Melo Egidio concerning the drawbacks involved in replacing the heads of the military services and that it wanted to show Melo Egidio the truth, or illusion, concerning its strength. It seems more logical to admit that the government--always ready, and with interparty solidarity on

this point, to confront or oppose the political weight of the president of the republic--suspected that General Melo Egidio was the bearer of a message and decided to give the actual source of that message an exemplary response.

The dismissal of General Garcia dos Santos directly affects General Ramalho Eanes, who promoted him, appointed him, and honored him. Because of his rapid rise in the military hierarchy, his intervention in the events of 25 April and 25 November, his political activity, the duties he has performed in the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, and his origins in the Communications Branch, the CEME has been the object of some controversy. But his military policy was eventually confirmed, and the commemorations of Army Day, the exhibit at the FIL [Lisbon International Fair], and the revelation to the country of the army it has have shown that General Garcia dos Santos knew what he was doing and what he wanted to do.

His speech in Evora, irreproachably "Atlantic" but openly calling for foreign assistance, reflected an orientation that coincided, or converged, with that of this government. Hence the process underway to reveal to the Portuguese "their army" and the speech on Army Day have served to underscore the fact that General Melo Egidio was right when he said: "I consider that only in exceptional circumstances could such replacements take place."

The measure being proposed by the government, which out of the three chiefs of the military services chose as its preferred target the only one who participated physically in the act of liberation on 25 April 1974, is supposed to be regarded as falling within the scope of "exceptional circumstances." Because this government knows that the "April military" (as well as the "April-November military" and the "November military," with rare exceptions) will feel discredited and offended as a result of the dismissal of one of their own. And because the government knows that General Melo Egidio was right when he said that a decision to replace the heads of the military services would be a factor for instability in the Armed Forces.

And what is more serious is the fact that the "exceptional circumstances" do not exist, while what does exist is a convergence of political schemes: one relative to the "system" and another relative to the Office of the Presidency of the Republic.

The government is relying expressly on "the greatest majority ever." The occasion selected for demonstrating its strength (real or illusory) over against the Armed Forces and particularly the army's "April military" was not well chosen, nor was the pretext used the most valid. Regardless of the reactions by those involved and whatever the political explanations may be, we are facing a new episode in an institutional guerrilla war which the Democratic Alliance cultivated and in which it wore itself out. The army is a particularly sensitive area within the Armed Forces as a whole. To the prestige of the "April military" must be added the aware, impartial, and rigidly professional but civically enlightened attitude of many higher-ranking officers. A crisis has been unleashed. The response will not be instability and agitation. The response will be slow preparations for reasserting esprit de corps. The army is not refusing to be subordinate to civilian authorities--the government--but it considers

itself an autonomous component of the "state apparatus." It wants to be led by its own people, to be commanded by its own people, and to have a voice in the selection of those who speak in its name and command it.

Choices made from the outside take on a political coloration. They reflect judgments which are largely nonprofessional.

General Melo Egidio--and he was probably not speaking only for himself--said one day: "It is not possible, on the one hand, for the country to want--very rightly--military men as such who are strictly independent, while on the other hand, political forces, which are necessarily partisan, choose military men for high posts."

#### Dismissal Seen Monumental Error

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 29 Jul 83 p 4

[Commentary by Jose Carlos de Vasconcelos]

[Text] Against the President of the Republic

1. If this singular government wanted to provide more conclusive proof that, quite the opposite of what it has been saying, it has no interest at all in real institutional peace and solidarity and in desirable cooperation with the president of the republic, it would be difficult to find a better way to do so than to propose, as it has proposed and in the way in which it proposed it, the dismissal of the army chief of staff.

This is because:

a) Of the person himself: As everyone knows, General Garcia dos Santos is a military man very close to Ramalho Eanes, who appointed him. They have collaborated very closely at various difficult moments in our democracy--specifically, in containing the revolt of 25 November. Garcia dos Santos was a very important individual in Eanes' candidacy for president in 1976 and later was head of the latter's Military Household and a member of the Council of the Revolution at the latter's suggestion. He was also appointed by Eanes, who was president of the republic and, at the time, CEMGFA, to the post from which the Soares-Pinto government is now trying to eject him.

Moreover, Garcia dos Santos has performed his duties as CEME with efficiency and correctness, thus demonstrating, incidentally, the competence, equilibrium, and capacity for work that he had already demonstrated in previous posts. The result of all this is that, according to reliable information from various sources that are above suspicion, the current CEME is well regarded and respected even by the majority of those who disapproved of his appointment to his present post.

b) Of the manner in which it was done: Considering that under the terms of the Defense Law, it is up to the president of the republic to dismiss and appoint the heads of the military services on the advice of the government and that any

appointment or dismissal therefore requires that the two organs of sovereignty agree as to their opinions and wishes, it is the minimum duty of those responsible for making these proposals to first exchange views with the individual who must make the final decision--who is, incidentally, not only at the top of the state hierarchy but also commander in chief of the Armed Forces (article 123 of the Constitution). This is especially true in view of the facts we outlined in the paragraph above.

But as is now known, the prime minister simply made the proposal known to the chief of state in writing without ever discussing the matter with him first, much less trying to obtain his agreement. This matter falls within a sphere--that of the Armed Forces--in which (at least in this case!) Mario Soares and Mota Pinto will have to admit that General Eanes is more knowledgeable than they are. It is also a sphere--that of the Armed Forces--in which even the president's sworn enemies acknowledge that he has played an extremely important and extremely positive role.

Therefore, first conclusion: the proposal to dismiss Garcia dos Santos is, objectively, in itself and by the way in which it was presented, an act of confrontation or even hostility directed at General Ramalho Eanes and a perfect example of how not to conduct the government's relations with the president of the republic.

2. But (and this is a very plausible hypothesis) the Soares-Pinto government may be trying to demonstrate that in practice, it is the only one that decides: that from now on, even in the Armed Forces, it is the government which proposes and disposes and distributes power, perhaps by the same strictly and narrowly partisan standards it has been applying in its appointment of officials in other sectors: the civilian governors, for example. In addition to harassing the president of the republic, that approach would present a clear picture of the president's lack of strength and his inability to intervene in this area as well, with the ensuing consequences.

Those who think that way are reportedly--or probably--trusting in what they describe as "Eanes' lack of political courage" (and in this area, I must say that in my opinion, that is not in fact one of the qualities which the president of the republic has demonstrated that he possesses in the highest degree in all circumstances). They are confident that his lack of political courage will lead him even to dismiss Garcia dos Santos in accordance with the proposal received.

On the other hand, if by chance Eanes does not do so, then the PS-PSD [Socialist Party-Social Democratic Party] government will not collect that dividend, but by way of compensation, it will have something else up its sleeve: it will say that the president of the republic is opposing its plans, that the government cannot get approval for what it wants, that this hampers or prevents it from governing, and so on. In other words, it will try once again to make Eanes the scapegoat, just as the AD governments did, although perhaps in different words.

## Against a Symbol of 25 April

3. If this singular government wanted to provide more conclusive proof that, quite the opposite of what most of its members have been saying, the military and the symbols of 25 April--to whom they owe the fact that they are in the government--do not deserve any special respect or consideration, it would be difficult at this moment to find a better way to do so than to propose, as it has proposed and in the way in which it proposed it, the dismissal of the army chief of staff while simultaneously reappointing the heads of the other military services to their posts.

And it is doing so for the simple reason that, as is known, General Garcia dos Santos is the only one of the current chiefs of staff who belonged to the MFA [Armed Forces Movement], which overthrew the dictatorship and established democracy in Portugal. He was even the number 2 man in the events of 25 April as head of the entire communications system. His presence at the head of the EME [Army General Staff] has thus become a symbol, and it is for that very reason, even though he has never adopted any political attitudes and no one can "accuse" him of having leftwing views, that obscurantist, antidemocratic, and extreme rightwing forces are persisting in a scurrilous campaign against him. (And it seems--at least it seems--that this proposal to dismiss him is the result of that campaign, whose backers are naturally delighted. This is also significant, especially from the standpoint of the political ethics of those responsible for it.)

But in addition to his essential participation in the events of 25 April, General Garcia dos Santos has always demonstrated that he is a democrat, in particular throughout the summer of 1975 and in the process that ended in containment of the totalitarian attempts and of the events of 25 November. At that time, the current CEME was again one of the chief members of the military operations commanded by Eanes.

By this we do not mean to say that the heads of the other military services, or at least most of them, are not also sincere democrats, nor are we trying to measure each one's degree of democratic conviction. The truth is, however--and again objectively--that Garcia dos Santos was the one who was shown by actual circumstances to be facing all the inherent risks and dangers and that he was capable of fighting and giving his all for freedom and democracy, and therefore for Portugal, whether against a fascist dictatorship or against totalitarian attempts from the other side.

All of this, then, leads to the second conclusion: the dismissal of General Garcia dos Santos appears to be directed against the symbol of the presence of the "April captains" at the highest level of the Armed Forces.

4. It should be noted, however, that the discriminatory character of the attempt to remove the CEME (in other times, it would have been called a purge) is even more obvious when it is considered that Garcia dos Santos has occupied that post only since January 1981, while his colleagues in the air force and navy have occupied their posts since January 1977 and October 1978 respectively. So this is not a rejuvenating measure or a matter of carrying out the idea, first

expressed by Ramalho Eanes when he was CEMGFA and now included in article 59.1 of Law No 29/82 (the Law on National Defense and the Armed Forces), that those posts should be held for no longer than 5 years. In fact, the legal provision in question (and without prejudice to the transitory provisions of article 71.2) stipulates that the various chiefs of staff "are appointed for a term of 3 years, which can be extended for 2 additional years." And unlike his above-mentioned colleagues, Garcia dos Santos has not yet been in his post that long.

It should also be noted--as can be seen in part from what was said above--that the government has not given any specific reason for its proposed dismissal of the CEME, and as Soares reportedly has admitted, the decision was purely a political one. This underscores even more strongly the significance and symbolism to which we referred under item 3 above.

#### Against Truce and Consensus

5. If this singular government wanted to provide more conclusive proof that, quite the opposite of what the prime minister has been saying, it is not seeking a truce and the broadest possible consensus among all or at least the most important sectors of Portuguese life, it would be difficult to find a better way to do so than to propose, as it has proposed and in the way in which it proposed it, the dismissal of the army chief of staff.

And this, in addition to all the rest, which space does not permit us to explain, is due to all the reasons we cited above and the fact that the consensus in question is even more important in an area as important and sensitive as that of the Armed Forces. We are witnessing extremely varied and extremely justified reactions to this proposal, which, I am deeply convinced, also merits opposition from most of the voters for the parties in power (but after an election, the parties quickly forget those who voted for them and the promises made). It also merits opposition even from outstanding members of those parties.

If we regard the necessity for that consensus and that truce as indisputable--and that is what we have been fighting for (which, incidentally, has earned us severe attacks from those who oppose the current formula for government most systematically)--and if it is true that the country has extremely serious and priority problems in the economic and financial area whose solution is urgent, what is the point of endangering that consensus and that truce even further with this absurd proposal? And why contrive this useless and narrowly localized war at this particular moment, when there are so many important wars on a nationwide scale in which we should all be struggling?

And from that, if it needs to be made explicit, we get the third conclusion: in addition to all the rest, the Soares-Pinto government has disregarded the essential in favor of what is secondary, it has forgotten its desire for the broadest possible truce and consensus, it has contrived a war where there should be the peace that is so necessary to make room for other wars that are indispensable and nationwide in scope, and it has created instability where there should be stability and problems where they did not exist (as the CEMGFA, Melo Egidio, warned, incidentally, although with unfortunate wording and in an untimely way).



## Against Dignity and Justice

6. Furthermore, the government did what it did:

a) In the most incorrect and least worthy manner: the communication to the CEME (see our news report [not included]) was delivered in inadmissible circumstances (on the opening day of the big army exhibit at the FIL), with the public announcement being made on Army Day itself, the proper explanations were not provided for the CEME, and so on. The result is that even those who disapproved--or had disapproved--of Garcia dos Santos have felt that in addition to being a gratuitous affront to the CEME, the government's action is also an affront to the army itself.

b) In the most unexpected and inopportune manner: there was a general conviction, based on statements by the very people responsible--especially the deputy prime minister and minister of defense--that there would be no changes for now and that they would only occur within an overall framework of restructuring--and therefore naturally and without causing problems--when General Melo Egidio entered the reserve in February 1984.

Moreover, it was just a few days ago that a new deputy CEME, General Salazar Braga, was appointed at the suggestion of General Garcia dos Santos. Obviously, there would be no justification at all for agreeing to that appointment if the intention existed at the time to replace the chief of staff himself within a few days. Incidentally, the choice of Salazar Braga by Garcia dos Santos was one more weighty proof that the CEME has conducted himself in all areas in accordance with military criteria.

c) In an obscure and incompetent manner: on top of it all, the PS-PSD government proposed to the president of the republic that the CEME be dismissed and that the heads of the other military services be retained. However:

c.1) A proposal for the "reappointment or dismissal of the current chiefs of staff" is provided for only in article 71.1 of the Defense Law (it is one of the final and transitory provisions). But according to that provision, such a proposal must be made "within a period of 5 days counting from the date on which the law takes effect." It is obvious that that time limit expired long ago (the law was published on 11 December 1982).

But even if it was intended, as seems to have been the understanding (erroneous, in my opinion), that that time limit would not apply to the Balsemao government, which first resigned and then stayed on as a caretaker government, the fact is that the 5 days have long since expired in that case as well, whether we count from the date on which this government took office or the date on which its program was approved. So the time limit expired long ago, and that was regarded as one more sure sign that with a minimum of common sense, the government was not going to meddle now with the heads of the military services.

c.2) So since article 71.1 does not apply, the proposal to dismiss the CEME can only have been made under the terms of article 59.1 of the same law, which talks about the "authority to dismiss at any time" the heads of the military

services. The only thing is that under that hypothesis, there can only be a proposal for dismissal, never for "reappointment." By presenting its proposal, the government--which is headed by lawyers--has also committed what I consider a deplorable legal error.

To sum it all up, the fourth conclusion: the Soares-Pinto government has adopted an unexpected, inopportune, and incorrect attitude, it has acted in a way that strikes one as disrespectful of the army and the army chief of staff, and it has not complied with the law!

And now the fifth conclusion: it has thus demonstrated a lack of political intelligence as well, since in addition to running the risk of not being able to remove Garcia dos Santos, it has increased the latter's support and generated within the army a movement of understanding and solidarity around Garcia dos Santos that includes even part of the minority which previously wanted him to be replaced.

#### Ramalho Eanes' Right and Duty

7. In any case, one thing is certain: the government had the right to propose the dismissal of General Garcia dos Santos, and it did so.

For his part, the president of the republic has the right to disagree with the proposal and not dismiss the CEME.

But more than a right, General Ramalho Eanes has the duty not to dismiss Garcia dos Santos. It is a duty in every way and for every reason: national, military, political, and ethical.

Ramalho Eanes is also in a position--which the government is not--to judge and decide correctly in this case: on top of everything else, the president of the republic and commander in chief of the Armed Forces knows the Armed Forces better, he knows the army better, and he knows Garcia dos Santos better. If by chance--and we mention this only as a hypothesis for our purposes--he were to agree to the proposal, what we have said here about the government would apply with even more reason.

It even surprises us that after receiving the proposal and considering the way in which it was made, he did not immediately make the imperative decision and announce it publicly. We are also surprised that some people, who generally seem to express the viewpoints of sectors in Belem Palace or close to Belem Palace, are recalling that the law establishes no time limit in which the president of the republic must announce his decision and that as a result, he could do nothing for some time to come or--preposterously--until the end of his term of office.

In this case, as one wishes that it were in all cases, clarity and the frontal approach must be the fundamental keynote of political practice. And one cannot put forward as a factor to be considered in reaching a decision the hypothesis (which some are trying to suggest) that if the chief of state does not accede

to the proposal being made to him, there may be resignations within the government or even a resignation by the government itself.

In spite of everything, it is probably exaggerated and unwarranted to believe that anyone in the government, much less the entire government, is even considering such an antipatriotic and antidemocratic possibility. But if by some chance it were to happen--and this, too, can only be admitted as a hypothesis for our purposes here--the president of the republic could never give in to such pressure (not to call it something worse). On top of everything else, that would be a clear symptom of his political decline and would mean that never again could he refuse to agree to anything the government wanted. He would thus lose all possibility of intervention and initiative.

There are moments that are decisive in establishing certain rules and manners of conduct and relationships, both on the personal level and among the organs of sovereignty. This is one of them.

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## PLANNED DISTRIBUTION OF NUCLEAR DECONTAMINATION EQUIPMENT

Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 23 Jul 83 p 20

[Excerpts] Nuclear decontamination equipment is going to be distributed gradually to military units throughout the country. That is what DIARIO DE LISBOA learned yesterday afternoon during the opening of the Portuguese Army Exhibit, which can be seen at the Lisbon International Fair through 31 July. The exhibit includes missile systems.

At one of the stands right near the entrance--that of the Engineering Branch--the visitor can view the diverse equipment used at the NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) School in Tancos. There are diving suits, chemical materiel, decontamination units, and so on. But one's attention is drawn to the robot used for reconnaissance and the deactivation of explosive devices. So far only one antinuclear field platoon has been established (in Tancos), but according to one army officer, there is a move to equip all units with platoons of this kind.

The exhibit was opened yesterday afternoon by the deputy prime minister and minister of defense, Mota Pinto, who was accompanied by General Garcia dos Santos, army chief of staff, and high-ranking military officers.

## Blowpipe Missile

Included with the most recent materiel incorporated into the Portuguese Army and now on view at the exhibit is a Blowpipe missile system from the United Kingdom. More specifically, it is a unit for training missile operators. The system fires missiles at a velocity of 1,713 kilometers per hour and has a range of 4,000 kilometers [as published]. It was used in the Falklands War and is part of the most recent battery to be set up in Portugal (Maio) at the Antiaircraft Artillery Training Center in Cascais [CIAAC]. This equipment arrived in our country about 2 months ago.

Another interesting display at the same stand is the AA20 machinegun (twin tube) with a coupled computer. It is of German manufacture and was acquired by the CIAAC about a year ago.

Another missile is on display at the stand sponsored by the Infantry Arm. This is the SS-11 B-1, mounted on a UMN vehicle with three launchers. According to

data supplied to DIARIO DE LISBOA, this materiel was acquired by the Portuguese Army about a year ago. One military official told DIARIO DE LISBOA: "We are in the phase of training personnel to [copy missing; presumably use intended] the missile."

The same equipment includes an armored personnel carrier that is also new. It is called the M-113 A-1. It is used at the Infantry Practical School and is operational in most countries.

World Debut: "Portaro GVM"

A world debut is being made at this Portuguese Army Exhibit by the military version of the Portaro GVM, which is being presented by the Electromechanical Automobile Company.

Now being exhibited for the first time, the Portaro GVM is a three-quarter-ton logistic vehicle that can be adapted for various functions ranging from command vehicle, missile launcher, combat car or recoilless gun, mobile communications post, and ambulance to rapid patrol vehicle.

Designed and developed by Portuguese technicians and manufactured completely in Portugal according to NATO standards, the Portaro GVM is intended basically for the armed forces, and its export to Switzerland is already anticipated. A civilian version of this four-wheel-drive vehicle will also make its world debut at the Geneva Automobile Show in 1984.

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